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Suppose a ‘fire’ breaks out in the digital realm. Which fire brigade would we call? 
Do we sufficiently understand the vulnerabilities? What should we prioritize in our 
fire-fighting efforts? What powers do the authorities have to minimize the number of 
victims and to limit the damage? Are their powers commensurate for our digital 
world? These questions take on renewed urgency when the ‘fire’ in question is not 
limited to the digital domain but, left unchecked, has the ability to disrupt the ‘real 
world’ and undermine confidence in public institutions. Answering these questions 
inevitably leads to fundamental questions about the role of government, citizens and 
businesses. These themes are the subject of this report.
1.1  Incidents – Large and Small – Are a Fact of Life
Incidents involving our digital infrastructure are to be expected in our rapidly digi-
tizing society.1 Governments and other public and private organizations around the 
world are warning us about the risks. Indeed, various types of disruption have 
already occurred.2 The problems can usually be resolved quickly, with the effects 
limited to inconvenience – these are the minor blazes. But in recent years, we have 
also witnessed incidents with much more serious consequences:
• In the Netherlands, the 2011 DigiNotar crisis was the first to reveal our depen-
dence on digital technology.3 Hackers released forged certificates from the certi-
fication authority, compromising the reliability of all DigiNotar certificates, 
which browser providers such as Microsoft threatened to declare invalid. This 
1 Section 1.2 discusses terms such as incident, disruption, disaster, societal disruption and digital 
disruption in more detail.
2 Clarke & Knake, 2019 ; Schneier, 2018; Greenberg, 2018.
3 Prins, 2011.
2
meant that important functions of government, such as customs clearance for 
goods and the payment of surcharges, could no longer be carried out. The inci-
dent was resolved but made headlines around the world by revealing the vulner-
ability and importance of private certification authorities for secure communication 
over the internet.4
• In 2016, a DDoS attack targeted the American company Dyn, a Domain Name 
System (DNS) provider.5 Internet platforms such as Twitter, Netflix and Reddit 
could not be accessed in the United States and Europe for most of the day. The 
attack was carried out with the Mirai botnet, consisting of compromised con-
sumer devices such as webcams and digital video recorders. DNS providers 
translate web addresses into IP numbers, enabling computers to access websites. 
Some described the attack on Dyn as an attack on the internet itself.6
• In 2017, WannaCry – which at the time was assumed to be ransomware but has 
since been attributed to North Korea – infected the computers of Chinese univer-
sities, Spanish electricity and gas companies, the French car company Renault 
and the rail transport company Deutsche Bahn, among others. The most promi-
nent victim was the UK’s National Health Service. The services of around 600 
healthcare institutions were disrupted, including the cancellation of about 19,000 
patient appointments; some accident and emergency locations were unable to 
provide care to patients and had to be relocated. It took the NHS about 1 week to 
return to normal. Estimated cost: £92 million.
• Also in 2017, hackers working for the Russian military distributed the NotPetya 
ransomware by exploiting vulnerabilities in Ukrainian accounting software, 
which they had previously hacked. The virus affected companies and organiza-
tions worldwide, with reports of damage running into the billions. The Rotterdam 
division of the Maersk container company fell victim to the cross-border chain 
of contamination. Like many other ports worldwide, container transport ground 
to a halt. So did the surrounding rail links and highways, causing congestion and 
long traffic jams. In the Dutch town of Oss, the production of medicines by the 
pharmaceutical company MSD came to a stop. MSD also lost a great deal of 
documentation.
• In March 2018, the US city of Atlanta fell victim to a digital attack. Months later, 
many basic municipal services were still unavailable. The city lost tens of mil-
lions of dollars; numerous data files, including police files, were lost for good.7 
Many other municipalities, corporations and public institutions such as universi-
ties have since fallen victim to similar ransomware attacks, often paying the 
attackers to restore their systems and retrieve lost information.
4 Van der Meulen, 2013.
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Dyn_cyberattack
6 See WRR, 2015 for the importance of basic protocols such as DNS for the internet’s functioning.
7 https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/06/08/atlanta-ransomware-attack-destroyed-years- 
of-police-dashcam-video/
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• Human error, broken servers, software issues and external factors such as cable 
breaks and power failures can also jeopardize the functioning of digital infra-
structure. In June 2019, Google Cloud suffered outages due to regular mainte-
nance work8 and could no longer support one-third of its own traffic. In the event 
of disruption, Google prioritizes the data traffic which should remain available. 
But the slowdown also affected Google’s own capacity to recover, which led to a 
longer outage than would otherwise have been the case. Like Amazon Web 
Services in 2017, Google Cloud had already suffered an outage in 2018 due to a 
simple typing error.9 In all of these cases, the outages did not last for more than 
a few hours; it remains unclear whether large cloud providers could cope with 
longer outages. The effects of such disruptions will grow as more and more com-
panies switch to cloud-based services and more societal processes come to 
depend on these providers.
The severity of these incidents continues to be debated. The global financial 
damage caused by WannaCry was enormous and human lives were endangered. The 
same was true of the NotPetya attack, the effects of which had similar cross-border 
patterns. But did these attacks truly disrupt society? Although the DigiNotar inci-
dent in the Netherlands revealed unforeseen problems, they were resolved. The 
record thus far has muddied efforts to place the threat of digital disruption on the 
political agenda and generally accept the seriousness and urgency of this problem. 
Nevertheless, we would be amiss to downplay the potential of such incidents or to 
imagine that a major disruption is unrealistic.
1.2  Disruptions at the Heart of Society
The potential scale of disruption has grown enormously in recent years. According 
to the OECD project ‘Future Global Shocks’ back in 2011, few cyber-related events 
had the potential to cause a global shock.10 But the authors were already pointing to 
the growing risk of financial damage due to compromised computers and telecom-
munications services. They also added that digital services would be essential for 
recovery operations following other types of large-scale disasters.11 Almost a decade 





060819%20 (1) & utm_medium = email & utm_source = en. For Google’s own report on the out-
age see: https://status.cloud.google.com/incident/cloud-networking/19009
9 See: https://www.geekwire.com/2017/amazon-explains-massive-aws-outage-says-employee-error- 
took-servers-offline-promises-changes/
10 Sommer & Brown, 2011.
11 Cf. Prins, 2010.
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relief today are unthinkable without digital tools, the Covid-19 crisis being a case in 
point. And the potential impact of incidents involving digital infrastructure has only 
grown: in geographical scope as well as how they affect real-world infrastructure 
and the daily lives of citizens.
Digital disruptions can now jeopardize the core processes of society. WannaCry 
caused parts of the UK’s healthcare system to fail; DigiNotar threatened to disrupt 
the Dutch government’s digital services and parts of the payment system; the hack 
in Atlanta led to the loss of important public data. In the meantime, we have already 
moved into the next phase: the taking out of facilities. In 2016, hackers infected a 
power station in Kiev with malware, knocking out one-fifth of the capital’s power- 
generating capacity12 – an incident that will go down in history as the first time 
malicious actors managed to remotely switch off a public utility. Things have only 
accelerated since then. In 2017, hackers succeeded in gaining control of software in 
US power plants.13 June 2019 saw media reports of disruptive malware that the US 
had placed in the Russian electricity grid.14
The costs for society are also rising. Lloyd’s estimates the damage that would be 
caused by the failure of cloud services in the United States at 5 to 53 billion US dol-
lars.15 The IMF reports that the potential damage to financial institutions caused by 
cyber-attacks could run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. These are estimates; 
there have been too few incidents to calculate potential damage with any degree of 
certainty. Nor is there consensus over what losses different types of incidents could 
generate.16 What is clear is that the potential for human victims and material damage 
is growing as society becomes ever more reliant on digital technologies. The US 
cyber expert Bruce Schneier explains:
With smart homes, attacks can mean property damage. With banks, they can mean eco-
nomic chaos. With power plants they can mean blackouts. With waste treatment plants they 
can mean toxic spills. With cars, planes and medical devices, they can mean death. With 
terrorists and nation-states, the security of entire economies and nations could be at stake.17
Digital attacks have become an instrument of geopolitical conflict as the traditional 
struggle for control over land, sea and airspace has been extended to the digital 
realm.18 The struggle here is not about defining boundaries, but about sabotaging 
societal and economic processes and the strategic position of other countries. All in 
all, the question is no longer if – but when – we will need to deal with the conse-
quences of a large-scale cyber-attack.
12 Cf. Sanger, 2018, chapter 7.
13 https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-us-power-systems/
14 See https://www.google.nl/amp/s/www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber- russia- 
grid.amp.html and https://www.google.nl/amp/s/www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/europe/
russia-us-cyberwar-grid.amp.html
15 Lloyd’s & Cyence, 2017.
16 OECD, 2017.
17 Schneier, 2018: 16.
18 WRR, 2017.
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1.3  There Is No Such Thing as 100% Security – But Are 
We Sufficiently Prepared for Disruption?
The growing scale, distribution and impact of incidents are partly due to the rapid 
pace at which the world is embracing digital technology.19 Digital technology is also 
becoming ever more complex with the exponential growth of data, computing 
power, and the exchange of data between devices, between people and devices, and 
between technology and the physical environment. We are now adding chips and 
sensors to almost everything, while everything is being connected to the internet. 
The next phase of this development – the ‘Internet of Things’ and artificial intelli-
gence – will make all kinds of processes even faster and smarter. The result is that 
interaction between the digital world and the physical world is becoming ever more 
intense. In some sectors, the digital realm and the physical realm are already diffi-
cult to distinguish.
Alongside countries like Denmark, Estonia, Singapore, Finland, the US, Norway, 
the UK and Sweden, the Netherlands is at the forefront of the digital evolution. It 
has high connectivity, a digitally adept population, and highly digitized public ser-
vices. Actively supported by the government, consumers and companies are embrac-
ing all kinds of digital activities. But every technological development has its flip 
side: advantages (the ‘highway to efficiency’) as well as disadvantages (the ‘high-
way to failure’).20 Digitization is no exception.21 Digitization creates prosperity, 
individual freedom and convenience; countless nations are fully committed to these 
aspirations. But digitization also brings new vulnerabilities and dependencies,22 to 
the economy and core societal processes as well as to the safety of people and their 
property.23 Although the stakes are presumably higher for highly digitized countries, 
countries lower on international indexes of digitization are not immune.
Many governments are well aware of society’s growing vulnerability to digital 
disruption.24 The UK government expects that the country, measures notwithstand-
ing, will suffer a major cyber-attack.25 In Austria, there is discussion of a ‘Digitalen 
19 Schwab, 2016.
20 Turner, 1978; Perrow, 1983; Boin, 2017.
21 Pupillo, 2018: 1.
22 Schneier, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2017: 6; NCTV, 2018a, b: 5.
23 Internet Society, 2017: 10.
24 There has been no systematic international comparison of cyber security policies and institu-
tions. See Van der Zwan and Spit (2015) for a cursory comparison of efforts to protect vital infra-
structure; Janczewski and Caelli (2016) for the position of some smaller countries in cyber-attacks; 
Boeke (2016) for the role of the defence ministry in cyber-attacks in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Estonia and the Czech Republic.
25 For the British cyber strategy see: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf
For parliamentary deliberations and reports: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/
jtselect/jtnatsec/1708/1708.pdf
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Stillstand’ scenario caused by cascade effects.26 The United States and France have 
developed systems of categorization for cyber incidents to determine the appropri-
ate time to take direct action. The European Union has various initiatives to ensure 
that digital disruption can be adequately addressed.27
All of these cyber-security measures aim to prevent major incidents. But there is 
no such thing as total information security – an inconvenient truth that is often for-
gotten. Whether inside or outside the digital domain, incidents can and will occur, 
leading to real-world disruption. Countries have contingency plans as well as legis-
lation and regulation to deal with major disruptions due to natural and industrial 
disasters. But when it comes to cyber security, contingency planning has been much 
more limited. While many policy documents include sections on the possibility of 
serious disruption, their primary focus is achieving a higher level of protection or 
measures to reduce risks.28 The scenario of major disruption thus serves to encour-
age people to take prevention more seriously. Only rarely are concrete measures set 
out for dealing with the consequences of incidents that do occur.29
1.4  Structure of This Report
Cyber security and the prevention of digital disruption are not the focus of this 
report. We begin with the premise that we must face the real possibility of a scenario 
in which digital disruption leads to societal disruption. In short, we have to think 
about our response in concrete terms.30 This report thus inquires: How can govern-
ment better prepare itself for societal disruption in a digitizing society?
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 defines societal disruption to clarify 
the type of events we are addressing. Section 3 analyses how digitization is chang-
ing the context in which these events occur. Section 4 discusses the challenges that 
the government faces in terms of preparedness, detection, combating, and 
26 http://www.darc-c12.de/system/files/Projektbericht-Digitaler-Stillstand-final.pdf
27 For example: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/NL/C-2017-6100-F1-NL-MAIN- 
PART-1.PDF and http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/NL/C-2017-6100-F1-NL- 
ANNEX-1-PART-1.PDF
28 Cyber security is defined in Dutch policy as ‘the entirety of measures to prevent damage due to 
the disruption, failure or misuse of information and communication technology and, where dam-
age does occur, to rectify this’.
29 An example is the letter from the Dutch State Secretary of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
addressing information security in government. It states that ‘Citizens, businesspeople and other 
organizations must be able to continue to rely on the government, including in the digital age’ 
(Ministry of the Interior & Kingdom Relations, 2018: 6). Measures include ‘ensuring that impor-
tant digital facilities of government are sufficiently able to withstand failure or outage.’ But except 
for the capacity to generally communicate about responses to incidents, the measures do not con-
cern responding to incidents once they have happened.
30 Cf. Prins, 2017.
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recovering from major digital incidents. Section 5 presents our conclusions and 
recommendations.
We conclude that digitization has led to new forms of societal disruption and thus 
to a new set of tasks for government. Our recommendations concern policies regard-
ing dependencies, critical infrastructure, competencies, priorities in combating the 
consequences of incidents, and compensation for victims, including the insurability 
of damages
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This section first explains the concept of ‘societal disruption’ to clarify what type of 
events we are addressing in this report. If events have a significant digital compo-
nent, we speak of ‘digital disruption’. Because societal disruption in policy practice 
is often linked to national security and ‘critical assets’, we also consider the classi-
fication of critical processes and critical infrastructure.
2.2  Societal Disruption
As societal disruption follows catastrophic events such as major floods or pandem-
ics like Covid-19, it is intricately linked to the concept of risk. Risk is often defined 
in the literature as ‘probability x consequence’.1 Societal disruption concerns the 
consequences of that risk: the risk that damage will actually occur. While policy 
documents often refer to ‘societal disruption’, there is no clear definition of the 
term. Clearly, a major disaster would disrupt society. But it is more difficult to 
define a clear threshold as different types of events will differentially disrupt soci-
ety, the market and government. Nor does disruption have to start at a clearly defined 
point. Like a smouldering peat fire, disruption may begin under the surface, its full 
extent only becoming apparent later. We explain the meaning and scope of the con-
cept of societal disruption below by discussing: (1) ‘normal’ societal functioning; 
(2) the severity of disruption; (3) the role of perception;  and (4) the duration of 
disruption.
1 See WRR, 2008: 53–86 for an explanation of the ‘classical’ approach to risk.
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2.2.1  A Disruption of Everyday Life
Societal disruption implies the disruption of everyday societal processes. By ‘every-
day societal processes’, we mean the regular functioning of the institutions of gov-
ernment, society and the market. If everyday societal processes can no longer 
function adequately – whether due to additional costs or inadequate public confi-
dence – this counts as serious disruption, with consequences for society, economy 
and government, including justice, elections and the legislative process. We discuss 
the ‘normal functioning’ of society’s institutions both in terms of verifiable damage 
to the continuity of society and people’s perceptions of disruption.2
2.2.2  ‘Serious’ Disruption: Failure of Core Processes
In the event of serious disruption, societal processes such as payments, the internet, 
public transport, healthcare, drinking water and electricity may stop functioning or 
switch to a less efficient mode. The continuity of society would no longer be guar-
anteed. Long traffic jams or queues could form, large quantities of goods could pile 
up, information and services could become inaccessible or unreliable, so that many 
everyday activities would no longer be possible. At this point, disruption would also 
lead to major economic damage. It may be direct damage, such as to flood defences, 
homes, computers and company installations, but also indirect damage due to busi-
ness failures or the disruption of the activities of third parties. Finally, there may be 
physical casualties: human injuries and deaths.
2.2.3  Perceived Disruption
All of this can, in principle, be verified and quantified, and expressed in financial 
terms for compensation purposes, for instance. But alongside the material effects, 
there is also the risk that citizens lose confidence in the institutions of government, 
the market economy, or the society in which they live. Would they experience the 
disruption as an inconvenience or as a serious violation of their daily lives? The 
answer depends on people’s value systems3 as well as the extent of their self- 
reliance4 during and after the disruption.
How people perceive the competence of private and public organizations, par-
ticularly that of the government, matters greatly. Did the government take adequate 
preventive measures? Was it able to take swift action to restore the normal 
2 Cf. PBL, 2014: 7–11.
3 Douglas & Wildavski, 1982; Hood, 1998.
4 Cf. WRR, 2017b.
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functioning of society? If citizens, companies or organizations feel they can no lon-
ger rely on the continuity of normal societal functions, the foundations of the demo-
cratic constitutional state may be undermined. What makes digitization particularly 
problematic is the blurring of geographical boundaries; it may not always be in the 
power of national governments to quickly restore the normal functioning of society.5
The rule of law – which provides fundamental certainty in our society – is based 
on the premise that we live in a nation-state that can legitimately exercise a monop-
oly of violence within a clearly defined territory. If this principle is undermined, for 
example because the state can no longer successfully claim this monopoly, people 
may lose faith in society and the rule of law. In the event of serious digital disrup-
tion, it would also be unclear which resources the state can call on.6 Such consider-
ations would inevitably exacerbate the public perception of disruption.
Whether we are talking about an interruption to social services, economic dam-
age, the number of victims, or the loss of confidence in society and government, 
these must reach a certain scale to merit the use of the term ‘societal disruption’.
2.2.4  Duration of Disruption
A gradual, possibly unnoticed series of minor disruptions may have the same cumu-
lative effect as an event that explodes onto our consciousness. In the former, the 
consequences of an event remain under the radar and only become clear gradually. 
The steady spread of disinformation, for example, undermines public confidence in 
institutions, which can harm the functioning of society over the long term. In the 
latter, cause and effect are largely indistinguishable; the seriousness of the situation 
is immediately obvious.
The passage of time is an important factor in the costs of disruption. Longer 
disruptions mean higher costs.7 Ultimately, the adverse consequences of an event 
and assessments of damage will unfold over time.8 More broadly, this also applies 
to the reputation of companies, organizations and governments. Inadequate detec-
tion systems and sluggish responses will impact the public’s confidence in govern-
ment, which by definition is expected to respond to serious situations swiftly and 
effectively.
5 Bovens, 1998; WRR, 1998.
6 Digitization poses anew what constitutes violence; it no longer only involves physical violence, 
but also new forms of ‘digital violence’.
7 Jocqué, 2016. For the costs of ‘cyber breaches’ relative to time of detection, see e.g. EPSC, 
2017: 4.
8 Lindenbergh & Hebly, 2016.
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2.3  Critical Infrastructure and Critical Processes
Governments often view societal disruption through the lenses of national security 
and critical infrastructure. For the Dutch government, national security encom-
passes various ‘critical’ interests: territorial integrity, economic security, ecological 
security, physical security and social and political stability. The definition of national 
security has recently been extended to include ‘other situations that (may) have a 
major impact on society’.9 These include ‘critical’ processes that are so crucial that 
their failure or disruption would lead to immediate societal disruption or undermine 
national security. Together, these processes form the Netherlands’ ‘critical 
infrastructure’.10
Critical infrastructure denotes a range of services upon which society depends. 
Critical infrastructure must be protected from natural and technological disasters 
(e.g. floods and nuclear accidents). More recent understandings of critical infra-
structure, however, transcend the traditional focus on national defence and military 
considerations. The focus of security policy has expanded beyond hostile actors, 
their capacity and motivations, to include the general vulnerabilities of society as a 
whole. Underlying this broader definition is the more diffuse spectrum of threats 
since the end of the Cold War, and new societal vulnerabilities due to our depen-
dence on information systems.11
2.3.1  Critical Processes
The broader definition of critical infrastructure has led to a different approach to 
risk. In the absence of reliable data on the likelihood and impact of the risks society 
now faces, the focus has shifted from the potential causes to the potential conse-
quences of the failure of processes critical to society’s functioning. A classification 
of critical processes provides guidance for politicians, policymakers and other 
stakeholders to determine whether a particular situation should be considered seri-
ous – and thus whether the government should take action and, if so, how. After all, 
it is impossible to protect all societal functions against every possible threat all of 
the time, and we need to distinguish critical from non-critical processes. Assessments 
by the Dutch government have quantified the consequences of failure of each pro-
cess as it bears on potential economic, physical and social harm. Consideration of 
9 NCTV, 2016: 8. These include ‘a local or regional incident or accident with many casualties, an 
incident or accident abroad with a large number of Dutch casualties, or international events which 
affect the Netherlands’.
10 See Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 30 821, no. 23 and Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 30 
821, no. 32.




cascade effects resulted in two categories of critical processes, based on the serious-
ness of the impact of their failure.
The ‘critical’ nature of societal processes also depends on their organization and 
the risk of disruption.12 This includes the presence of back-up options and recovery 
time – decisive factors for the extent of damage or the number of victims if things 
go wrong. Impact is not a fixed measure; it depends on the resilience of the actors 
responsible for the critical process in question.
Overviews of critical processes therefore differ, both over time and from country 
to country. Governments compile different lists or add new areas to reflect the latest 
threats. In 2017, the United States reclassified elections infrastructure as critical.13 
Germany includes the media and certain cultural goods.14 While healthcare regu-
larly features in international overviews of critical infrastructure, Dutch hospitals 
and other healthcare institutions have recently been dropped from the list.15 As in 
the DigiNotar case, the critical importance of certain processes often only becomes 
clear after they suffer disruption. We will return to the implications of these national 
differences in the next section.
2.4  Digital Disruption
Digitization means that societal functions and processes are vulnerable in new and 
unexpected ways. This vulnerability applies to both regular processes and processes 
classified as critical by the government, since most critical processes are already 
bound up with digital infrastructure. By ‘digital infrastructure’, we mean all facili-
ties for the storage, exchange and processing of digital data. Until about 10 years 
ago, the risk of the disruption or failure of these facilities was absent from almost all 
national and international risk analyses. This has changed over the past decade. The 
risk of the disruption or failure of digital infrastructure has risen rapidly through the 
ranking of risks that would have disruptive consequences for society.16
The disruption or failure of digital infrastructure can have many causes, from 
accidental (errors) or deliberate human actions (often of a criminal or at least unlaw-
ful nature) to the spontaneous failure of systems or the semi-autonomous behaviour 
of machines. There are also more indirect causes such as fires, power failures or 
floods that damage servers. These causes can occur separately or in combination 
and can result in both acute and gradual disruption. Where societal disruption has an 
important digital component, we refer to ‘digital disruption’.





16 The World Economic Forum scores the same risks each year, giving us an idea of how digital 
disruptions rank relative to other risks.
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The scope of this report does not extend to the exact likelihood and consequences 
of digital disruption. Recent studies have already addressed these questions, both in 
the Netherlands17 and abroad.18 The potential of digital disruption leading to signifi-
cant economic damage and social unrest is real, and is the premise of our analysis 
in the following sections. Our aim is to formulate an agenda for measures that could 
be taken to prepare society for such disruption, focusing specifically on what gov-
ernment can do.
2.5  Conclusion
We use the term ‘societal disruption’ to refer to serious disruptions to the regular 
functioning of society. What constitutes ‘regular’ societal functioning and ‘serious’ 
disruption will depend not only on the interruption of core processes in society but 
on the confidence that citizens, companies and public and private organizations 
have in them. The two feed into one another: a major disruptive event will inevitably 
undermine public confidence in society as well. At the same time, a series of smaller 
events may exacerbate the sense of threat and undermine confidence in the govern-
ment, even if the event’s actual significance is limited.
By identifying critical processes, the government seeks to set priorities and 
ensure that not all disruptions are classified as ‘major’. This helps to direct scarce 
resources to where they can be used most effectively and legitimately. The list of 
critical processes is the result of an assessment of their importance and vulnerability 
to disruption and failure. That the disruption and failure of digital infrastructure can 
also have socially disruptive effects is now widely recognized. In the following sec-
tions, we use the concept of digital disruption to describe these effects.
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Digitization is placing new demands on how we deal with incidents that threaten to 
undermine core societal functions and processes. Societal disruption will almost 
inevitably flow from the disruption or failure of digital infrastructure given the inter-
dependence of the digital and physical realms. Digitization also poses new chal-
lenges for policy makers as the use of digital technology leads to complex, 
cross-border networks with geopolitical implications.
3.2  Our Growing Dependence on Digital Technology
The role of digital technology in society has exploded in recent decades with the 
growth of ‘datafication’, computing power and connectivity. While each trend 
brings countless new opportunities to society, they have also altered the risk land-
scape for citizens, companies, organizations and states.
3.2.1  Datafication
Ever more societal processes are based on the flow of data and information.1 
‘Datafication’ has three main features.2 The exponential growth of data being stored 
and exchanged is due not only to targeted collection and voluntary provision, but 
1 WRR, 2011a.
2 WRR, 2015: 27–28.
18
also to constant production through automated processes.3 Data is also coming to 
play a more autonomous role in the functioning of society, with datafication chang-
ing the nature of data collection and its analysis through algorithms. The growing 
range of applications means that for ever more sectors and for ever more people, 
data is the raw material on which ‘real-world’ processes are based and ‘real-world’ 
actions are taken. Data has thus become an essential factor of production for count-
less companies. Public services rely on data, for example the interwoven system of 
healthcare and rent allowances.4 For citizens, data is the oxygen that allows them to 
participate fully in society.
Datafication makes us more vulnerable to societal disruption by increasing the 
importance and vulnerability of data processes and files. A large number of recent 
incidents have shown user data to be inadequately secured, stolen by criminals, or 
held ‘geopolitical hostage’. The scaling up of data-use not only exacerbates these 
vulnerabilities, but also means that ever more people can be affected. Some inci-
dents have compromised the data of many millions of people. Malicious actors are 
also becoming more focused, seeking to hack into organizations such as banks and 
hospitals. With both the growing application of data and our dependence on it, prob-
lems involving the reliability, availability and integrity of data can also have more 
serious consequences, partly because they support core processes in everyday life. 
The failure or disruption of a digital system means that an important factor of pro-
duction is no longer available or can no longer be relied on. It would be akin to 
dealing with a factory or a government department with no staff, or at least with a 
great many absent employees.
3.2.2  Computing Power
Increased computing power allows us to automate ever more complex processes. 
The most recent phase in this development is the use of algorithms, which allows us 
to process larger amounts of data than ever before and make decisions more rapidly 
as they are partly automated. When smart digital systems are properly programmed 
and trained, they are more reliable than humans in making rapid and complex deci-
sions. But the speed and scale at which digitized systems make complex decisions 
means that things can quickly get out of hand when things go awry. Due to system 
complexity, problems can no longer be attributed to individuals, especially when 
multiple systems are communicating automatically. An illustrative incident is the 
Dow Jones Newswire’s accidental publication of a report about Google’s purchase 
of Apple in 2017, meant as a technical test. Automated trading robots responded 
within milliseconds, and the impact on stock prices was severe.5 Another example 
3 Kitchin, 2014: 87–98.
4 WRR, 2011a.
5 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/business/media/dow-jones-google-apple.html
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was the 2010 ‘flash crisis’, when a trillion dollars in stock value evaporated in min-
utes due to unintended machine-to-machine interactions.6 A more recent issue is the 
Russian interference in US elections, cunningly using automatic newsfeed systems, 
the scale of which only became apparent after extensive research.7
The failure of an automated system can result in societal functions and processes 
running less efficiently, becoming unsafe, or failing altogether.8 An example is the 
21 August 2018 rail outage at Schiphol Airport, caused by an error in the Dynamic 
Traffic Management System (DVM) software.9 DVM software, used to manage the 
rail infrastructure around Schiphol, normally ensures that rail traffic routed through 
the Schiphol tunnel keeps flowing as smoothly as possible. When the DVM failed, 
the train routes between Amsterdam and Schiphol had to be managed manually. 
Instead of the normal average of 20 trains per hour, only 4 trains were able to run on 
this route for an extended period, affecting around 50,000 passengers. The incident 
revealed the importance of a well-functioning fall-back option and the availability 
of people with the skills to take control without the help of automated systems.
3.2.3  Connectivity
A third aspect of digitization is growing connectivity. The number of internet users 
continues to grow rapidly, as do the number of devices connected to the internet, the 
amount of data exchanged, and the number of applications and services managed 
online. Cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence are 
expected to further reinforce connectivity, increasing the potential for serious con-
sequences when societal disruption occurs. This is because efficient networks are 
crucial for the continuity of core societal processes and for quick and effective reso-
lution if things go wrong.
For most digital services and applications, organizations can choose between 
different providers. But for some basic functions of the internet, there is no alterna-
tive.10 Opinions vary regarding the vulnerability of the internet.11 To date, the inter-
net has been surprisingly resilient, finding its way around problems through its 
decentralized design. It is probably partly for this reason that no major crisis has yet 
occurred. The more connected an organization, network, or country, the better able 
it is to absorb shocks. At the same time, existing methods of attack may be scaled 
up – a DDoS attack using IoT devices, for instance.12 Our growing reliance on the 
internet also means that greater connectivity can have further-reaching impact.
6 Schneier, 2018: 85.
7 Sanger (2018, 185, 255) mentions 80,000 posts on Facebook, possibly seen by 126 million peo-
ple, and 288 million readers of Twitter messages. The impact of this remains unknown.
8 See e.g. Stratix (2017: 4) for telecom failures.
9 Van Gompel, 2018.
10 WRR, 2015: 66.
11 E.g. Van Eeten & Bauer, 2012; Van Ruijven & Duijnhoven, 2018.
12 See e.g. Pras, 2014.
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It is also difficult to determine which parts of the internet are truly indispens-
able.13 While we can make technical distinctions, in practice this is not always use-
ful. If large data centres, internet exchanges or authentication services fail, a large 
section of the population would suffer the consequences. The same applies to large 
cloud providers, as recent disruptions at Google and Amazon have shown. 
Technically, such problems would not affect the ‘core’ functions of the internet but 
would jeopardize many online services. The same applies to local physical infra-
structure that links organizations to the internet or connects them in other ways, 
such as through mobile facilities.14 Examples here include major network operators. 
Were one of these operators to go down due to for instance a power failure, this 
would not ‘bring down the internet’ but would restrict local connectivity and lead to 
major problems. Such organizations might in fact be ‘too connected to fail’.15
3.3  Chains, Networks and Complexity Transcending Borders
The developments described above have led to major changes in how society is 
organized. Organizational processes have become intertwined with data systems, 
with the resulting chains and networks transcending national borders and growing 
in complexity. This makes it increasingly difficult to anticipate and respond to soci-
etal disruption.
3.3.1  Chains and Networks16
The availability of fast and cheap hardware and software has led organizations to 
base their production and services on real-time planning. This reduces storage costs, 
ensures the efficient use of capital and allows rapidly adapting to changed circum-
stances. But in the event of hardware failure or a network connection outage, the 
supply of goods can quickly dry up. The opposite happens at the other end of the 
chain, or elsewhere in the network, where goods may accumulate. NotPetya led to 
congestion at Maersk terminals around the world because the international registra-
tion system for containers ceased to function. With such flows and production 
chains interrupted, the economic security of the Netherlands would quickly enter 
the danger zone.17
13 Broeders, 2017. See Mueller, 2017 for an explanation of fragmentation and the internet.
14 Van Ruijven & Duijnhoven, 2018.
15 Snyder, 2017.
16 For the distinction between chains and networks, see WRR (2011a: 72). A ‘chain’ is a  linear 
process in which different organizations work towards a shared end result outside their own orga-
nization. ‘Network’ refers to  a  relatively open relationship in which nodes are related to other 
nodes through multiple, traversing and often redundant connections.
17 See WRR, 2017 for an analysis of flow security and how it is addressed in policy.
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The internet and other large-scale networks allow controlling processes remotely. 
Organizations are increasingly making use of open networks, with devices commu-
nicating via protocols. This communication regularly takes place over the public 
internet to save on the costs of setting up a dedicated communication network. One 
problem with linking management systems to larger networks or to the internet is 
that these systems are sometimes outdated and no longer receive support from 
external suppliers or their own organization. While these systems may function 
safely in isolation, when linked to larger networks their vulnerability is a major risk 
as outsiders can access them much more easily. This applies to the systems used for 
drinking water, payment transactions, and the operation of canal locks and sluice 
gates.18
Chains and networks have intrinsic vulnerabilities and suffer disruption when 
their individual links fail. Information is scattered between actors, whose actions 
can unintentionally affect others in the chain. Digitization adds new vulnerabilities 
involving interfaces with the outside world, for example electronic patient records 
in hospitals and shared IT services such as data storage and cloud services.19 Such 
applications add new parties to the system, creating new dependencies. They often 
also lead to more interactions, with all the accompanying risks of disruption.
Failures within chains and networks can result in cascade effects, particularly 
where components are intricately connected. Cascade effects occur when an osten-
sibly isolated problem affects the rest of the network, and possibly beyond it.20 The 
consequences are far-reaching when many parties depend on the same service or 
supplier. This has traditionally been the case for the electricity supply, meaning that 
power outages top lists of events with major disruptive potential. The question today 
is whether parts of our digital infrastructure now occupy a similar position. Although 
hard evidence is hard to come by, a large-scale analysis of incidents in Europe 
shows that telecoms (37%) and internet (7%) services are second and third behind 
the energy sector (47%) when it comes to cascade effects.21 Examples of major 
dependencies are legion, ranging from the use of Microsoft operating systems and 
Intel chips in most computers to banks and companies relying on the services of a 
handful of major international cyber-security companies.22 The market for cloud 
services is also dominated by an extremely small number of companies (Amazon, 
Google, Microsoft and Salesforce).
18 CPB, 2018: 14; Netherlands Court of Audit, 2019.
19 Van Ruijven & Keijser, 2017; cf. Luiijf & Klaver, 2015; ENISA, 2018b.
20 Klaver et al., 2013.
21 Van Eeten et al., 2011.
22 ChipSoft is now the largest supplier of new hospital electronic health records in the Netherlands, 
followed by Epic. Nine of the last ten implementations came from one of these two companies. 
https://www.zorgvisie.nl/hoe-konden-chipsoft-en-epic-zo-dominant-worden/
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3.3.2  Beyond National Boundaries
Digitization means that almost every organization is vulnerable to disruptions in 
networks or supply chains because they depend on the products and services of third 
parties. At the same time, these networks and chains often cross national borders. 
Global connectivity, global production chains and IT facilities mean that the causes 
of a societally disruptive failure in one country can reach far beyond its borders. The 
internet itself is virtually without borders, meaning that any organization connected 
to the internet could, in principle, be attacked from anywhere in the world.23 Due to 
these factors, societal disruption could quickly become borderless.24
The disappearance of national borders also manifests in how facilities and ser-
vices are globally connected. Dutch companies, government institutions and citi-
zens depend on a limited number of large – mainly US-based – software providers, 
IT service providers and security companies. Many cloud services simply run some-
where on the internet, not necessarily in one location. The use of cloud services may 
protect the continuity of processes, precisely because data is stored in multiple loca-
tions. Due to their elastic capacity, cloud providers are also better able to mitigate 
DDoS attacks and to update software as soon as patches become available. The 
revenue model of cloud providers also provides them with strong incentives to 
ensure the security of their facilities, which is often better than that of their 
customers.25
At the same time, the use of cloud services is creating new vulnerabilities. Cloud 
servers increase the number of parties, devices and applications involved, giving 
attackers more opportunities to access targeted systems. More data flows back and 
forth, increasing the chances of disruption. There are also concerns about delegating 
control over data and applications to cloud providers. Many cloud services consist 
of a layered and complex combination of platforms and services, involving contrac-
tors and subcontractors; this makes it unclear who is responsible for what – espe-
cially when things go wrong.26 It is their size and the very large number of companies 
and organizations that use cloud providers that make them ‘too big to fail’. At the 
same time, this makes them attractive geopolitical targets.
3.3.3  Complexity
The number of connections, products, services and actors means that systems are 
becoming increasingly complex and difficult to understand or quickly bring under 
control. Physical and digital systems are inextricably linked; as operational and 
digital technologies merge, cyber security (securing systems) and safety (the safety 
23 Dunn Cavalty, 2007: 14.
24 Boin, 2017.
25 Hon & Millard, 2018: 350.
26 Michels & Walden, 2018: 32–37.
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and reliability of systems) are intertwined. This creates new problems. For example, 
updates to operating systems and user software can have major unintended conse-
quences for the functioning of systems in hospitals. That the damage caused by 
WannaCry involved missing updates is only half of the story (see inset). The other 
half is that the complex digital environments of organizations render updates time- 
consuming; updates entail risks that must first be explored before they can be imple-
mented safely.
WannaCry and the UK’s National Health Service27
The global ransomware attack known as WannaCry began on Friday, 12 May 
2017. Within a day, it had affected over 230,000 computers in at least 150 
countries. One of the most high-profile victims was the NHS in the 
UK. WannaCry exploited a known vulnerability in Windows, for which 
Microsoft had already released a patch 2 months earlier. The NHS had not yet 
implemented the patch; the malware spread mainly through the internal net-
work of the affected hospitals.
WannaCry disrupted services in one-third of UK hospital trusts (around 
80) and 8% of GP practices and NHS organizations (around 600 institutions). 
About 19,000 patient appointments were cancelled; 5 out of the 27 accident 
and emergency centres infected were unable to provide care to all patients and 
had to be relocated. Communication during the crisis also became more dif-
ficult because the use of e-mail was in many cases no longer possible. It took 
the NHS about 1 week to return to normal.
Estimates of the total financial damage caused by WannaCry worldwide 
range from a few hundred million to a staggering four billion dollars. The UK 
Department of Health and Social Affairs calculated the costs of the incident, 
broken down into costs incurred during the crisis and costs the following 
week, and into direct costs (lost production in terms of patient care) and the 
additional IT support needed to restore affected data and systems.
During Aftermath Total
Direct costs £19 million 0 £19 million
IT costs £0.5 million £72 million £73 million
Total £20 million £72 million £92 million
27 Based on: https://www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-wannacry-cyber-attack-and-the-nhs/# 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/747464/securing-cyber-resilience-in-health-and-care-september-2018-update.pdf
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‘Complex’ means more than just ‘complicated’. A complicated system consists 
of many parts and connections but is ultimately organized. A complex system con-
sists of many parts and connections and, in part, lacks organization. Complex sys-
tems are characterized by multifaceted interactions that follow their own local rules; 
there are no overarching rules or principles that characterize the various interactions 
that can potentially take place.28 If these interactions are closely aligned and tightly 
organized, disruption can have a significant external effect and lead to problems at 
the system level.29
This raises doubts about the current trend of linking all sorts of devices and sys-
tems to the internet without due regard for potential consequences, including for 
corporate and government systems, devices in hospitals, and physical infrastructure 
such as canal locks. Once they are connected to the internet, these systems are 
potentially vulnerable to errors and disruptions in other parts of the global infra-
structure. This means that society is now vulnerable to unexpected system failures 
on a much larger scale.30 The OECD notes that the ‘indirect effects’ of such errors 
or disruptions may lead to significant damage.31
Complexity becomes a problem if something goes wrong. An explosion may 
occur at the location where chemicals are mixed or where fireworks are stored; in 
terrorist attacks, the perpetrators are usually active on the ground or have left explo-
sives there at an earlier stage. But in the disruption or failure of digital facilities, 
cause and effect may be far removed in physical terms. This makes it more difficult 
to determine causality, particularly when malicious actors are involved, and how 
and where authorities should act. Which organization should the authorities be 
looking at, and where? Which systems are involved and who is using them? It can 
also be unclear whether and under what circumstances a course of action, such as 
forcing entry into a system, will lead to disruption. The right moment to intervene 
is difficult to determine.
3.4  Geopolitics
Digitization has changed the position of countries in the world, especially countries 
with open societies. Digitization has increased their vulnerability, providing a much 
wider ‘area of attack’ for malicious actors. It has also given them the means to do 
serious damage, made even more attractive by the anonymity of the internet. 
Dependence on foreign providers also raises questions about the technological 




30 Clearfield & Tilcsik, 2018: 242.
31 OECD, 2003: 45. Klaver et al. 2013 argue that the second and third-order effects of disruptions 
can be grave if they affect processes vital to other sectors and services.
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3.4.1  Dependence on Large Foreign Providers
Especially in western countries, many organizations that provide these core services 
are privately owned. This is especially true of organizations that work with digital 
technology. The Dutch government largely depends on Fox-IT for the integrity and 
confidentiality of government information. For telecommunications services, the 
government relies on companies such as KPN. Due to such dependence, acquisi-
tions are sensitive.32 For example, the emergency number 112, the national com-
munication network for emergency services (C2000), the Emergency Communication 
Facility, and the fibre optic network for defence and telecommunication services for 
Schiphol Airport would be potentially vulnerable to discontinuity if they were to be 
acquired by a provider from another country.33 For many Fox-IT services, there is 
no alternative; the recent takeover of Fox-IT by a British party gives pause for 
thought.34
In addition to corporate takeovers, this issue also applies to tenders and invest-
ment in new technology. C2000 is currently maintained by an originally German 
company (Hytera) now in Chinese hands. The Chinese company Huawei is working 
with all major telecoms companies in the Netherlands and has many contracts in 
Europe to build 5G networks. There is suspicion that such companies are – with or 
without their knowledge – undermining Dutch society by enabling espionage, dis-
ruption or sabotage by other states. Some of the countries in which these companies 
are based have legislation that could force these firms to cooperate with their gov-
ernments. Partly for this reason, the Dutch government decided in 2018 to phase out 
the use of Kaspersky’s antivirus software.35
Particularly the growing presence of Chinese companies in EU member states is 
perceived as a risk to national economic security.36 An underlying problem is that 
the internet is intrinsically insecure. Companies have an interest in an open and 
unsafe internet as this enables them to collect a great deal of user data.37 But an open 
and unsafe internet also helps governments to undertake surveillance, often exploit-
ing the lack of security in companies’ existing systems, especially telecoms compa-
nies as they offer access to so much digital data traffic. China is certainly not the 
only country that intrudes into digital systems to collect information, with the abil-
ity to launch full-fledged cyber operations. The United States, France, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, Israel and Germany all have professional military cyber units and 
32 NCTV, 2018.
33 Bulten et al., 2017: viii.
34 Bulten et al., 2017; Van de Hoven van Genderen, 2017.
35 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/14/voorzorgsmaatregel-ten-
aanzien-van-gebruik-kaspersky-antivirussoftware. Meanwhile, policy is being developed for 
secure software and hardware; see Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate and Ministry of 
Justice and Security, 2018.
36 AIVD, 2019.
37 Schneier, 2018: 56–59; cf. Zuboff, 2019.
3.4 Geopolitics
26
intelligence services with their own means of attack. Building up offensive cyber 
capacity is much cheaper and easier than aiming for a safer internet by, for example, 
investing in public interest technology or regulating vital infrastructure.38 The net 
effect of building offensive cyber capacity is an increasingly unsafe digital realm.
3.4.2  Malicious States
Various actors have the capacity and motive to disrupt the core processes of society. 
Criminal actors and states constitute the leading threats to national security.39 
Criminals focus on where they can gain the most or have the greatest impact; 
increasingly, this means public services. In addition to major financial institutions, 
hospitals are increasingly targeted due to the sensitive personal data they possess 
and society’s dependence on healthcare facilities and services. States tend to focus 
on espionage – with more than a hundred countries possessing the means for it – and 
the undermining of core processes in other societies. Of all malicious actors, states 
have the greatest resources at their disposal; they can choose specific goals, work on 
achieving them over long time horizons, and cause the greatest damage.
While the initial fear was that cyber weapons could destroy national electricity 
supplies or military command structures, they now appear to be aimed primarily at 
more mundane areas, often in pursuit of specific goals. Examples include the shut-
down of the oil company Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia, the destruction of a blast 
furnace in Germany,40 the paralysis of municipal computer systems in Atlanta, and 
the manipulation of elections. Such actions take place almost daily, not to destroy 
other countries but to disrupt their functioning and undermine citizen confidence. 
There are no international rules about what is permitted and about proportionate 
responses.41 States are reluctant to help develop cyber-specific international rules of 
conduct. With their own activities in cyberspace often shrouded in secrecy, actions 
often go unanswered and continue unimpeded.
38 For examples see: https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2019/02/public-interest_tech.html
39 There is no generally accepted typology of malicious actors. It is also unclear what constitutes 
‘malicious’. NCTV, 2018 distinguishes between states, criminals, terrorists, hacktivists, cyber van-
dals and script kiddies, and insiders. This categorization is, in amended form, based on an exten-
sive typology of threat actors by De Bruijne et al., 2017. Boundaries between these actors can be 
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3.4.3  The Perfect Weapon
Digitization offers the opportunity for achieving major impact using relatively sim-
ple techniques, as seen in attacks on the core functions of the internet.42 Such attacks 
can affect many sectors, making them an attractive first step in an escalating con-
flict. They are much cheaper and easier to carry out than attacks on specific organi-
zations or networks, as they do not require access to the target system which can 
take months or years of preparation. Attacks can also be switched on and off with 
the touch of a button, making them highly effective means to exert pressure. 
Alarmingly, attacks on the core functions of the internet remain limited in discus-
sions over national security and cyber conflict.43
Attacks on the Core Functions of the Internet: Dyn, Mirai and the 
Internet of Things
In 2016, the Domain Name System (DNS) was corrupted by a DDoS attack 
using the Mirai botnet.44 With the failure of the little-known DNS provider 
Dyn, major platforms such as Twitter, Netflix, Reddit and many other popular 
websites and services were inaccessible in the US and Europe for most of the 
day. Thousands of compromised consumer devices from webcams to digital 
video recorders were enlisted in the attack. A similar attack later targeted 
major media websites in France.45 Some consider the Mirai botnet attacks as 
a dress rehearsal.46
There have been many attacks on the DNS, including one on all 13 DNS 
root servers in 2002.47 In 2015, China launched a 5-day DDos attack on 
Github for hosting websites that bypassed its censorship restrictions – the first 
time a state used its own digital infrastructure for offensive purposes. Also in 
2015, hackers attacked Turkey’s top-level DNS (.tr), rendering all websites 
using the domain name – banks, media companies, all government organiza-
tions and military networks – inaccessible for at least a day. That attack lasted 
for more than 2 weeks. Attacks on the DNS are difficult to mitigate because 
they mimic normal user behaviour and are difficult to separate from normal 
internet traffic.
42 WRR, 2015, section 2.
43 Snyder, 2017 provides a comprehensive overview of possible disruptions of the internet’s core 
functions, with many examples; cf. Van Ruijven & Duijnhoven, 2018.
44 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Dyn_cyberattack
45 ENISA, 2018a: 50.
46 Scott & Spaniel, 2016.
47 DeNardis, 2014: 98.
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Cyber weapons seem to be the ‘perfect weapon’.48 They can be obtained cheaply 
and used for myriad purposes, from disrupting organizations that provide services 
essential to the everyday functioning of society to sowing uncertainty and dissatis-
faction. What is more, it is easy to cover one’s tracks.49 These features have led to a 
shift in the balance of power, with smaller countries now exercising more clout 
through the digital domain, able to take part in the global battlefield even if they lack 
the wherewithal to enter into large-scale military confrontation. Cyber-attacks such 
as NotPetya and WannaCry have also shown that the alleged perpetrators (Russia 
and North Korea, respectively) are prepared to accept a great deal of collateral 
damage.50
3.5  Conclusion
We can draw a number of conclusions:
• There is a very high degree of interdependence between the digital domain and 
the physical domain. Developments such as ‘datafication’, the use of algorithms 
in decision-making, and the complex web of connections between systems 
around the world mean that the physical realm now merges seamlessly with the 
digital realm. Societal disruption will increasingly have both a digital and a phys-
ical dimension.
• The continuity of everyday life has traditionally been a major public interest. In 
a digitized society, this interest remains undiminished.
• Digitization means that society is now vulnerable to new forms of disruption due 
to unstable and often poorly secured software and hardware as well as complex, 
cross-border supply and production chains. These create many opportunities for 
malicious actors to disrupt societal processes or even to take them down entirely.
• Digitization also means that the continuity of core societal processes at the 
national level largely depends on parties based overseas, specifically major pro-




50 The Stuxnet attack on nuclear power stations in Iran, attributed to Israel and the United States, 
led to great collateral damage. Around 50,000 computers were infected in India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Germany. See Schneier, 2015: 150.
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Prevention is better than cure, goes the adage. There is much to be said for preven-
tion, especially when there is a chance to avoid the consequences of disruption 
altogether. But even if we take every preventive measure under the sun, we can 
never entirely exclude the possibility of serious disruption to the normal functioning 
of society. We therefore need to be prepared and to have early-warning mechanisms 
that can alert us when things are going awry. If disruption does occur, adequate 
follow-up action is vital. Recovery and reconstruction are key if society is to resume 
its normal functioning as rapidly as possible.
For physical risks such as major flooding or a severe flu epidemic, the govern-
ment and other actors have identified measures to increase preparedness, detect 
early signs of disruption, minimize the impact and facilitate recovery. Probably 
more than any other event, the Covid-19 outbreak has underlined the importance of 
swift and coordinated responses. The Dutch government, however, has only recently 
recognized the risk of societal disruption due to the failure or disruption of digital 
infrastructure. Partly for this reason, we are unprepared. Extant policies focus on 
cyber security and prevention rather than on handling disruptive events as they 
unfold. This section discusses how our plans for digital disruption could be designed 
to include better preparation for its effects on society. We distinguish between four 




Detection, mitigation and, in particular, recovery and reconstruction largely depend 
on how well we are prepared to handle societal disruption. Unlike prevention, they 
involve measures that seek to limit the effects of the disruption and to facilitate 
recovery. They are comparable to the role played by firebreaks in a forest or artifi-
cial hills in flood defences, which do not prevent flooding but provide protection 
from the rising waters and limit the number of victims. Precautionary measures can 
likewise limit the societal disruption caused by ‘digital fires’. The first stage is pre-
paredness. Within this category, we distinguish between four areas: fall-back 
options, isolation, cyber security exercises, and the provision of information.
4.2.1  Fall-Back Options
Options for switching to different facilities come in many shapes. The most well- 
known is the back-up facility, a diesel generator to generate power in an emergency. 
A crucial issue is how long this type of facility would have to function. With back-
 up facilities for digital systems, one consideration is how long data needs to be 
retained, which would depend on the type of data involved. Following the NotPetya 
attack, Maersk was able to save much of its data by contacting data centres around 
the world. But what was missing was a back-up of how the company’s own IT sys-
tem – the digital core of the company – was set up.1 The Maersk case shows the 
importance of companies to plan ahead. Some processes have become so large and 
complex that back-up facilities are practically impossible to implement, partly due 
to cost. In short, back-up facilities are important but are no longer the obvious solu-
tion for certain processes.
Another possibility when considering fall-back options is using multiple provid-
ers, applications or infrastructures so that contingency options are available. But 
this is not always feasible. There is no real alternative to the global internet, where 
the only realistic approach is a long-term joint effort by national governments, com-
panies, non-governmental organizations and experts to make the internet more 
secure.2 Another hurdle for having multiple contingency options is the poorly func-
tioning market for digital services and products, particularly in the field of cyber 
security.3 The result is that governments, companies and organizations worldwide 
must choose between a handful of large providers.4 Precisely because of their size 
and importance, these providers are attractive targets for geopolitically motivated 
attacks. At the same time, they have become ‘too big to fail’ for major sections of 
the global economy.
1 Maersk was able to restore this system through sheer chance. One of its terminals in Ghana had 
been down during the incident due to a local power outage. This terminal escaped the NotPetya 
attack, allowing Maersk to make a copy of the system. See Greenberg, 2018.
2 WRR, 2015; Mueller, 2017.
3 Overvest et al., 2018.
4 The three largest Dutch banks depend on the services of the security company Akamai. See 
Overvest et al., 2018.
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That said, concentration also has advantages when it comes to limiting disrup-
tion. Precisely due to their scale, large cloud providers are often better protected 
against cyber-attacks than the organizations that use them to host their data. With 
economies of scale, the services of these providers are often cheaper than those of 
smaller parties. At the same time, customers need to be confident that these giants 
are taking adequate measures to handle disruption. If many customers simultane-
ously face the same problem, questions will inevitably arise about who gets priority. 
The outage of Google Cloud (see Sect. 4.1) showed that Google had all kinds of 
contingency plans in place. The question is to what extent these plans are consistent 
with the public interests that the government represents.
An alternative fall-back option would be returning to more ‘old-fashioned’ ways 
of working. In the event of disruption or the failure of digital facilities, organiza-
tions are usually still able to temporarily revert to less efficient modes of working 
through paper-based methods or the manual operation of mechanical installations. 
But this assumes that employees are still able to work with these older systems, and 
that those systems remain available. The rise of digitization and robotics has meant 
that manual skills and ‘old-fashioned’ facilities (such as local bank branches), and 
even cash itself, are rapidly disappearing. Preparedness implies that alternative 
methods and skills to assure crucial societal functions remain available. An illustra-
tive example comes from the US Navy, which has decided to teach recruits how to 
navigate by the stars again.5
4.2.2  Isolation
Firebreaks are used in forests to contain large fires. In the event of a nuclear disaster, 
the reactor is encased in a concrete shell to minimize radiation leaking into the envi-
ronment. For every form of disruption, there are strategies for containing the inci-
dent and preventing the damage from spreading. For digital disruption, network 
separation could play this role. Network separation entails placing partitions 
between different systems and the digital processes that handle these systems. The 
most radical form of network separation is for an organization to disconnect from 
the global internet, known as ‘islanding’ among IT experts. But in a highly con-
nected world, this is not always realistic.6 After all, these systems are connected for 
a reason, and islanding deprives them of this connectedness.7 The partial separation 
or temporary deactivation of specific networks are more attractive options.
When implemented properly, network separation can stop disruption in its tracks 
or prevent further contamination. Network separation is desirable for certain key 
societal functions, also because it reduces dependence on third parties. Nevertheless, 
most government organizations currently lack clear strategies for network separa-
tion and there is limited coordination. Organizations often independently decide on 
the form and extent of network separation. Departments are often reluctant to set 
requirements due to the additional costs.8
5 Mentioned in Snyder, 2017.
6 WRR, 2017: 21.
7 Boin, 2017: 9–10.
8 Geer et al., 2003.
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4.2.3  Cyber Security Exercises
At the national level, within the European Union and in the context of NATO, cyber 
security exercises focus on critical infrastructure. There are also sectoral initiatives such 
as in the telecommunications, water, and financial sectors. Cyber security exercises give 
us a more realistic picture of the form disruption could take and its potential conse-
quences.9 They also enable parties to identify risks and hazards, familiarize themselves 
with emergency procedures and practise taking decisions under duress. An additional 
goal is strengthening mutual trust, essential when responding to an emergency.10
The number of cyber security exercises rose sharply worldwide between 2002 
and 2015.11 They increasingly involve a mixed group of private and public organiza-
tions (see inset).
While the majority of cyber exercises take place in Europe, they do not cover all 
key sectors. Some exercises do not focus on digital infrastructure at all.13 Exercises 
that involve multiple organizations, focusing on the complex chains and networks 
within which they operate, are few in number. But such exercises are vital, not only 
to identify dependencies, but to gain better insight into the various standards and 
protocols that organizations use. Cyber security exercises help organizations to 
learn how others respond and who should be approached in common situations.14
Cyber Security Exercises for Financial Institutions12
The TIBER (Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming) initiative 
launched by the Netherlands’ Central Bank (DNB) tests connectivity within 
the financial sector. It is a public-private partnership that includes, among oth-
ers, the police, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 
banks, insurance companies, pension funds and the stock exchange.
TIBER focuses on simulating cyber-attacks on financial institutions, with 
ethical hackers copying the working methods of real hackers. Following the 
test, both the attacker and the bank provide crucial information about the 
resilience of digital security. Lessons learnt can be used to benefit the entire 
financial sector.
According to DNB, the TIBER test programme is an example of successful 
cooperation in the field of cyber security and could also be applied in other 
key sectors. A pilot programme is currently taking place in the energy sector 
in collaboration with the Cyber Security Alliance.
9 Lawson, 2013; Bergstrom et al., 2016.
10 Boeke, 2016.
11 ENISA, 2015: 22–23.
12 https://www.dnb.nl/en/news/news-and-archive/DNBulletin2018/dnb379565.jsp. See also: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/html/index.en.html
13 See e.g. Netherlands Court of Audit, 2019: 9.
14 EPSC, 2017.
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4.2.4  Provision of Information
Another way of mitigating the effects of digital disruption is to provide information 
about what is happening and how to best respond. What constitutes useful informa-
tion varies. Organizations affected by disruption need to know what actions they can 
take to limit the impact as much as possible. For instance, there are detailed com-
munication requirements for the failure of electronic payment transactions, designed 
to help restore confidence.15 Emergency services must have eyes on the ground; 
members of the public must know about first aid, emergency escape routes, and how 
to notify the authorities. The digital equivalent would include providing information 
about the installation of patches and about additional measures to reduce the risks 
of being affected.
The provision of information to citizens merits particular attention. During and 
immediately after societally disruptive events, citizens are often seen saving them-
selves and assisting others.16 But the longer a disruptive situation lasts, the more it 
affects people’s capacity to respond rationally. Little can be done about this. 
Research shows that citizens hardly ever prepare for disruptive events. They gener-
ally underestimate the likelihood of disruption or believe the consequences will be 
manageable. While people attach great importance to the government’s response to 
crisis situations,17 many governments prioritize asking citizens to take preventive 
measures. Information on coping with and responding to digital disruption is largely 
absent.18
Digital channels and social media can play key roles in crisis communication.19 
As almost everyone is connected to everyone else, people can be informed of dis-
ruptive events very quickly, even in real time, and be advised on how to get back to 
their normal daily business. Of course it is not only the government that uses social 
media: citizens communicate about incidents among themselves, sharing pictures 
and video clips, as happened during the attack on the Boston Marathon in 2013.20 
Social media can also be a highly disruptive factor in crisis communication. In the 
event of an incident, it is often members of the public who occupy ‘front-row seats’, 
broadcasting what they are witnessing to large numbers of other people and giving 
15 https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Joint%20Forum%20High%20Level%20Principles%20for%20
Businss%20Continuity_tcm46-145518.pdf?2019070914
16 Helsoot & Ruitenberg, 2004.
17 Donahue et al., 2014.
18 Frerks, 2018. On https://crisis.nl/wees-voorbereid/cyberaanval/, the Dutch government advises 
citizens about what to do before, during and after a cyber-attack. The advice for before and after 
an attack mainly concerns IT-related measures such as the use of antivirus software and changing 
passwords. The European Commission states that ‘Providing the public with information on how 
they can mitigate at user and organizational level the effects of an incident could be an effective 
measure to mitigate a large-scale cybersecurity incident or crisis’, illustrating how the provision of 
information still needs work in member states.
19 Simon et al., 2015.
20 Cassa et al., 2013.
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their own, often emotional, account of events. If an incident were to disrupt or take 
out digital channels of communication, this would  – in a society accustomed to 
rapid digital communication – only exacerbate people’s feelings of unease. It has 
become extremely challenging for governments to maintain the upper hand in pro-
viding information. In cross-border cyber incidents, EU member states only coordi-
nate their public communications to a very limited extent.
4.3  Detection and Early-Warning Systems
The early detection of disruptive events is important because the longer the signs go 
unnoticed, the greater the potential for damage.21 Early detection can take many 
possible forms, including the monitoring of networks and data flows; this approach 
is mainly technical in nature and will not be considered in detail here. We turn to the 
sharing of information between parties, an effective means to guarantee the perfor-
mance and continuity of key sectors.22 How this is organized and the development 
of a strategic information position are important factors.
4.3.1  Organizing the Exchange of Information
The exchange of information in many countries is organized through public-private 
partnerships. At the European level, the European Union Agency for Cyber Security 
(ENISA) and the European Computer Response Team (Cert-EU) are the primary 
information node and centre of expertise, representing the institutions of the European 
Union in numerous national and international forums. At the state level, National 
Cyber Security Centres fulfil similar functions, serving as the Computer Security 
Incident Response Team for national governments and critical service providers.
In the Netherlands, the exchange of information between government bodies and 
public and private actors has become much more comprehensive. Digital processes 
such as the government’s electronic message service and the identification and 
authentication of citizens and companies wishing to use government services have 
been designated as critical services. The implementation of the Network and 
Information Security (NIS) Directive means that internet exchange points, top-level 
domain name registries and DNS service providers fall under this regime.23 The NIS 
21 EPSC, 2017: 4.
22 Settanni et al., 2017; Luiijf & Kernkamp, 2015; Choo, 2011.
23 The NIS Directive applies to essential services rather than to key processes. Organizations that 
fall within these three categories provide a service essential to the continuity of critical and/or key 
economic activities. The provision of the service depends on network and data systems, and an 
incident would have a significant disruptive effect on the provision of that service.
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Directive obliges major digital service providers to report incidents and to take mea-
sures to manage risks and reduce the consequences of incidents.24 Although this 
extension of legislation is an important step, questions remain about the structure of 
the current system.25 While the exchange of information is largely organized along 
sectoral lines, digitized societal processes are often interconnected, meaning any 
disruption could be accompanied by cascade effects between sectors. A quick and 
effective response to disruption would require the exchange of information not only 
within sectors but between them.26
The exchange of information is also hampered by the distinction between ‘criti-
cal providers’ and ‘non-critical providers’. While critical providers exchange infor-
mation with each other and with the government through Information Sharing 
Analysis Centres, many organizations classified as critical use the services of par-
ties whose products and services are not classified as critical. The latter are not 
bound by the same reporting obligations as critical providers, although their opera-
tions may have a major impact on the continuity of critical processes (see inset).
Power Supply Under Pressure from Digitization27
The electricity system is classified as critical infrastructure in almost every 
country. Because this system increasingly relies on digital technology, any 
issues with digital technology could have a major impact on the supply of 
power. Yet the suppliers of digital technology are often not required to meet 
the same safety and security requirements as providers of critical services.
Advanced software and algorithms play a growing role in the supply, trans-
port, and distribution of electricity. This trend is introducing new vulnerabili-
ties. The risk of outages due to programming errors increases because 
processes in power plants and electricity networks are controlled by increas-
ingly complex software programs. Disruption can also occur if autonomous 
digital systems behave in unexpected ways and/or respond to one another in 
unexpected ways – a risk with pre-programmed systems for energy produc-
tion and supply from solar panels and wind turbines. Our digitized electricity 
system is also vulnerable to deliberate disruption, particularly now that many 
parts of the system are connected to the internet.
Because more and more societal functions depend on electricity, the con-
sequences of incidents are likely to be more serious. And because the power 
supply of many European countries is now interlinked, vulnerabilities in the 
electricity system of one country also pose risks to the electricity systems of 
other countries.
24 This includes online marketplaces, search engines and cloud service providers.
25 For references to critical reports, see CSR, 2017: 3.
26 Cf. CSR, 2017: 6.
27 Based on Council for the Environment and Infrastructure, 2018: 14–19. Cf. ENISA for further 
vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/power-sector- 
dependency
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The question is to what extent the current distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘non- 
critical’ providers should be retained. The same question arises for the critical and 
non-critical parts of government, because information flows transcend the depart-
mental boundaries and levels of government.28
The distinction between critical and non-critical processes also affects busi-
nesses and societal organizations. While companies and organizations deemed non- 
critical receive less information about vulnerabilities, they often fulfil key societal 
functions such as supplying medicines or checking the quality of drinking and 
swimming water.29 To bridge this gap in the Netherlands, the Digital Trust Centre 
has been set up as a counterpart to the Information Sharing Analysis Centres for the 
private sector. But the companies served by the Digital Trust Centre vary enor-
mously in the information they need, their ability to take remedial measures, and the 
potential impact on society of any disruption in their functioning. The same prob-
lem exists in other countries. The British Cyber Security Strategy identifies a num-
ber of ‘preferential sectors’ in addition to 13 vital sectors, on the grounds that ‘other 
companies and organizations’ also need more support.30
Although information sharing has improved significantly in recent years, the 
definition of society’s core processes requires adjustment. As these processes are 
increasingly digitized and embedded in complex networks, clear distinctions 
between ‘critical’ and ‘non-critical’ processes can no longer be made; nor will mea-
sures solely targeting critical processes necessarily improve our security. There are 
so many ‘unknown unknowns’ that it is impossible to know in advance exactly 
which processes or outages would lead to disruption.31 The cross-border chains and 
networks within which critical providers operate necessitate international informa-
tion sharing. We need a more strategic approach to information to better understand 
the dependencies involved.
4.3.2  Strategic Information
Cyber risks are relatively new and remain difficult to identify and evaluate. 
Nevertheless, important steps have been taken in recent years to share information 
on digital security measures, vulnerabilities and incidents.32 We know, for instance, 
that every piece of commercial software has many vulnerabilities, the majority of 
28 WRR, 2011a.
29 For examples see: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/had-de-storing-van-112- 
voorkomen-kunnen-worden~b235b093/
30 HM Government 2016. One criticism is that the more ‘vital’ processes are identified, the more 
complex the task of setting priorities becomes. See House of Lords, 2018.
31 Boin, 2017; Carr, 2015.
32 Hausken, 2007.
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which have not yet been discovered.33 In the meantime, vulnerabilities are also 
appearing in hardware (such as chips), meaning that it is possible to read the mem-
ory of computers without authorization.34 The landscape of malicious actors is also 
constantly changing. All this means that the task of identifying potential issues and 
publicizing the available solutions is never finished. Given the global and some-
times geopolitical nature of the threats, robust international cooperation and the 
structural involvement of intelligence services are vital.
Our current level of information sharing on security measures, vulnerabilities 
and incidents is insufficient for an adequate detection system. There are too many 
gaps in our knowledge about the chains and networks through which digital disrup-
tion could spread. We need detailed insight into the interdependencies between 
companies and organizations involved in society’s core processes, the importance of 
which are often underestimated.35 The potential effects of disruption further down 
the chain currently remain outside of risk analyses and crisis plans.
Understanding these dependencies requires analysis from an international per-
spective.36 While attacks often exploit generic vulnerabilities, incidents may affect 
European member states in different ways. The services of EU member states may 
be interdependent, meaning that incidents in one country can impact other coun-
tries, as seen for example in international payment traffic. Attackers’ use of net-
works to achieve their goals also means disruptions will have wider reach.
More knowledge is also required about the government’s strategic position. What 
crisis-management options are available? What dependencies would the govern-
ment have to contend with? Most providers of critical services are privately owned 
and do not fall under direct government control; many are based overseas. What 
authority would the government have over such parties? The context in which the 
government must operate is affected by market concentration and foreign owner-
ship. Although the risk of (foreign) share ownership is adequately contained in 
many sectors, it remains a key concern for critical infrastructure.37 As critical pro-
cesses are digitized, the same applies to dependence on (foreign) private digital 
service providers, such as cloud providers. Looking ahead, decisions will need to be 
made about investments in new digital technology. If the government does not antic-
ipate developments early and seek to manage them, it may become more difficult to 
manage digital disruptions when they occur.
33 According to Schneier (2015: 145–146), there are hundreds or even thousands of vulnerabilities. 
Pupillo et al., 2018 arrive at a much lower number (at least 14 vulnerabilities in an average soft-
ware program).
34 See for example: https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/01/what-do-meltdown-spectre-and-ryzenfall- 
mean-for-the-future-of-cybersecurity/?guccounter=1
35 NCTV, 2018; Klaver et al., 2013: 56; CSR, 2017.
36 ENISA, 2018: 21.
37 Bulten et al., 2017: viii.
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4.3.3  Responsibilities
Experience suggests that security within sectors does not improve unless the gov-
ernment takes a clear lead. But in complex, networked societies and economies, 
security also requires collective commitment from all parties involved.38 Here the 
responsibility of the government is to create the conditions which ensure the effec-
tive sharing of information. At the same time, the government should encourage, 
and sometimes require, market actors to take their responsibilities seriously and to 
develop the necessary capabilities to do this. The government has traditionally 
played this role to ensure the continuity of core societal processes. Their digitization 
means that the government must play this role in the digital domain as well.
Sharing and analysing information is necessary to improve the cyber security of 
organizations, to make them more resilient to incidents, and to limit the damage 
when incidents occur. But not all parties currently participate in the Information 
Sharing Analysis Centres. Some are reluctant to share sensitive information in light 
of competition, legal restrictions, national security, and the government’s ability to 
use it for law enforcement purposes.39 Such reluctance may be greater during a cri-
sis with reputational damage at stake.40 Nevertheless, security must be everyone’s 
priority.41 The challenge is for the government to improve its position without jeop-
ardizing security, confidentiality and the systematic sharing of information. The 
EU’s Network and Information Security Directive provides the tools for this by 
imposing stricter requirements on critical providers for reporting incidents.42 But we 
still do not know enough about how this will be supervised, or about the conse-
quences for violating the trust on which the sharing of information is based.43
4.4  Responding to Incidents
Digital processes have been affected by incidents large and small in recent years. 
Incidents in the Netherlands have been handled successfully, in that they did not 
lead to widespread societal disruption. This may tempt us to conclude that current 
instruments and regulations are adequate. But the continuing march of 
38 WRR, 2012.
39 Koepke, 2017.
40 Bharosa et al., 2010.
41 Van Vollenhoven, 2018: 80.
42 There are a number of reporting obligations. See Sect. 4.5.
43 Luiijf and Kernkamp (2015: 18) argue that relationships based on trust should be regulated 
through rewards (in the form of information from other parties) as well as sanctions (withholding 
information).
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digitization – particularly the growing interconnectedness of the digital and physi-
cal realms – encourages us to rethink existing frameworks and procedures. There 
are three specific areas where we need to reassess our existing instruments. We 
discuss them in turn below: legal powers, cross-border mitigation, and setting 
priorities.
4.4.1  Legal Powers
In the physical realm, the government has emergency services such as the police, 
fire brigade, ambulance and rescue teams to respond to crises. These and other ser-
vices have legal powers to carry out their duties, for example the ability to cordon 
off particular locations, enter a company’s premises or initiate an evacuation. But 
what resources can the government call on in the event of a digital crisis? The hack 
at DigiNotar in 2011 painfully revealed the government’s dependence on private 
actors to resolve problems in the digital realm.
The Acquisition of DigiNotar44
On 29 August 2011, the government received a report of problems at the 
DigiNotar certificate authority, responsible for securing electronic communi-
cations from and between government bodies (known as Public Key 
Infrastructure or PKI). Hackers had managed to release forged DigiNotar cer-
tificates. As a result, government certificates could no longer be relied on and 
were possibly even unusable. Goods at the Port of Rotterdam could no longer 
be accepted, social security payments were blocked, and the payments system 
compromised.
The immediate reason for the impending crisis lay with the major browser 
suppliers, including Microsoft, which were losing confidence in all DigiNotar 
certificates, including the PKI government certificates. This was a very real 
threat as Microsoft could have blocked the use of all DigiNotar certificates 
with its monthly security update to maintain confidence in its own systems. 
Regardless of the parties involved, Microsoft did not want to continue sup-
porting potentially unsafe communications.
At this point, the Dutch government had every interest in clarifying how 
many certificates had been manipulated or compromised. But despite urgent 
investigations, it was unable to retrieve this information. On 3 September, the 
government decided to take over the management of DigiNotar. There was no 
specific legal basis for this, but the Dutch government was able to count on the 
‘voluntary’ cooperation of its American parent company Vasco. Microsoft 
then postponed its security update in the Netherlands for 1  week, which 
bought enough time to replace the certificates.
44 Based on reports from the Dutch Safety Board 2012 and the Inspectorate of Justice and Security 
2012 that evaluated the Diginotar incident.
4.4  Responding to Incidents
44
At first glance, the Dutch decision-making structure for granting legal powers for 
crisis decision-making appears in good order. If societal disruption occurs, deci-
sions are made through structures set out in the National Guide for Crisis Decision- 
Making (NHC). There is also a National ICT Crisis Plan, currently under review. In 
the NHC, the government has three roles: facilitation, management, and coordina-
tion. The latter, including the deployment of the police and fire brigade, and requi-
sitioning resources, requires legal authority. The NHC also refers to ‘measures in 
the event of a major IT incident’ which are not set out in detail.46
The national IT Crisis Plan describes an IT crisis as ‘a threat or crisis that 
originates in the field of information technology, which places one or more 
vital interests in jeopardy and for which the regular structures are not 
adequate.’
In the event of an (imminent) IT crisis, the IT Response Board (IRB) is 
activated. The IRB – a flexible public-private partnership – analyses the crisis 
and, if necessary, advises the Interdepartmental Crisis Management 
Committee, the official communication channel for the Ministerial Crisis 
Management Committee, chaired by the Minister of Justice and Security or 
the Prime Minister.
Estonian Government and Gemalto45
The vulnerability in the chip of Estonian ID cards is a more recent example of 
the dependence of governments in solving problems in the digital realm. In 
September 2017, a vulnerability was discovered in a certificate that affected 
laptops and PCs as well as authentication to cloud applications. The vulnera-
bility also affected ID cards in Estonia and eID cards in Slovakia, Spain and 
other countries. In Estonia, the ID card is used to authenticate one’s person 
and to digitally sign documents. In theory, hackers were able to steal users’ 
digital identity and access sensitive personal information, manipulate the 
results of e-voting, and hack into the state’s information systems.
In November, the Estonian government decided to suspend all certificates 
of approximately 800,000 ID cards. Intensive users such as doctors were able 
to update their certificates at several government locations while the remote 
updating of certificates was disabled. Gemalto, the company that produced 
the chips, and the Estonian government, seeking €152 million in damages, 
traded accusations. The government was unhappy with Gemalto’s handling of 
the security breach, especially its failure to notify the government of the 
problem.
45 See Ventsel and Madisson 2019 for a reconstruction of the Estonian case.
46 The Dutch National ICT Crisis Plan includes nothing on this subject either.
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Private actors can be required to cooperate if (imminent) disruption or the failure 
of their systems could undermine the public interest. They are required to keep the 
government informed about the situation and to cooperate in tackling the causes and 
consequences of the disruption.47 But the interests of private organizations are not 
always consistent with the public interest that government represents; nor does the 
government have the means to force private parties headquartered overseas to coop-
erate. The government’s role in cyber security is often limited to providing advice 
or assistance to the private organizations that form the critical infrastructure. Such 
was the case when, partly due to the lack of powers to intervene, the municipal crisis 
response team in Rotterdam was unable to access information about the terminals 
and systems of the container company Maersk as they were being hit by the NotPetya 
attack (see inset).
A great deal of sector-specific legislation outlines the powers of the government 
in exceptional circumstances. During a crisis, parties are obliged to cooperate and 
to follow government instructions. The legislation, however, is lengthy and com-
plex.49 Extensive explanation would be needed for relevant parties to understand the 
implications. Although sectoral legislation can provide useful starting points for 
government intervention, the question is whether these powers are sufficiently com-
prehensive and suited to the problems of a digital world.
47 Luiijf and Klaver (2015: 266) argue for direct access to the relevant IT systems of producers.
48 Greenberg, 2018.
49 Muller, 2014: 45.
NotPetya and the Municipality of Rotterdam
In June 2017, hackers working for the Russian military distributed the 
NotPetya ransomware. One of the most prominent victims was Maersk, which 
runs container terminals around the world. The gates to ports could not be 
used, cranes ceased to work, trucks were unable to unload their cargo and new 
cargo shipments could not be booked. Maersk, an ultramodern shipping com-
pany, was forced to revert to a paper-based system.48
The terminals in the port of Rotterdam were affected by the attack. 
Container transport via the port as well as the surrounding highways and rail 
links ground to a halt, causing congestion and long traffic jams. The city 
authorities were unprepared. They had difficulty gathering the relevant actors; 
the municipal crisis response organization responsible for public order was 
initially denied information about Maersk’s terminals and systems. The city 
authorities were thus unable to assess the situation’s seriousness and whether, 
for example, there was a risk to public order.
Formal assistance from the National Coordinator for Security and 
Counterterrorism was impossible because Maersk’s APM terminals, unlike 
the Port of Rotterdam itself, were not part of the ‘critical infrastructure’.
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The government can also act without making use of sector-specific provisions. In 
a crisis, and if circumstances warrant, the law could simply be broken in a case of 
‘needs must’. This is not a desirable course of action.50 It would require a degree of 
improvisation, better minimized for maintaining the rule of law.51 Government 
actions – especially interventions by authorities such as the police and the public 
prosecution service – should be predictable and subject to accountability.52 A crucial 
question is whether interventions would be justified if they did not also serve the 
purposes of an investigation or prosecution.
The problem extends to who takes the relevant decisions and initiates the required 
actions. As in the physical realm, the primary responsibility of companies operating 
in the digital realm is to ensure their own security and to draw up contingency plans 
for emergencies. Large companies need to arrange for their own cyber security 
departments, sector-specific Computer Emergency Response Teams or employ the 
services of private cyber security companies.53 The government will only step in 
when circumstances involve (the risk of) societal disruption.
It is often not immediately clear who or what caused an incident, and in the case 
of deliberate disruption, the motive.54 It can thus be unclear whether government 
bodies such as the Ministry of Defence, the national cyber security authorities, the 
police or the intelligence services should take action. As each body has its own sets 
of powers and interests, the government’s approach could well depend on who 
responds to the incident: the police are primarily concerned with identifying perpe-
trators so that the public prosecutor can take action; the intelligence services are 
more inclined to protect their information position; the national cyber security 
agency, given its remit to ensure information security, openness and stability, 
focuses on remedial action. While the police also have the powers to provide assis-
tance and to prevent escalation, public order and security must be at stake.55 A 
national cyber security authority would not always be bound by this requirement.
In conclusion, legal powers for the digital domain and for mitigating disruption 
are not always sufficiently clear and well defined. The emphasis is currently on 
advising and supporting parties within infrastructure categorized as critical. But if 
parties refuse to cooperate, it is unclear what powers the government has to inter-
vene, and on what grounds. Given the limited powers of the national cyber security 
authority, which focuses on technical expertise and assistance, previous interven-
tions have largely been ad hoc.
50 Within the modernization of state emergency law, consideration is currently being given to sup-
plementing existing emergency powers with specific powers over certain IT services. See: https://
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/07/03/tk-modernisatie-staatsnoodrecht
51 See Kortmann, 2009.
52 To obtain information, the Public Prosecutor can initiate a search warrant process in accordance 
with art. 96c Sv. See Prins, 2019: 721.
53 For a similar argument, see Prins, 2012: 44–45.
54 Prins, 2012: 45.
55 Prins, 2019: 578.
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4.4.2  Combating Cross-Border Crises
Digital disruption will unlikely be confined within national borders. Research shows 
that cross-border crises are by definition challenging.56 Nevertheless, some steps 
have already been taken at the international level. For example, the EU has put vari-
ous crisis management provisions in place, some specifically for cyber security.57
The capacity of these facilities has improved in recent years.59 While cross- 
border initiatives have been initiated to improve cyber security in critical sectors, 
such as energy and transport,60 existing mechanisms for dealing with cross-border 
crises are fragmented across a range of institutions. Their functions are not always 
clearly defined and, according to experts, their effectiveness is at best limited.61 
Although the NIS Directive should lead to improvements, it still does not provide a 
framework for EU-level cooperation in the case of major cyber incidents.62 EU 
The most important initiative is the Cyber Security Strategy of the European 
Union which dates from 2013, on which the 2016 Network and Information 
Security Directive and the 2018 Cyber Security Act are based. The NIS 
Directive obliges member states to establish a national centre for cyber secu-
rity and establishes European level cooperation between these centres. The 
Cyber Security Act strengthens ENISA, the EU agency for cyber security.
The EU has a number of specialist cyber security organizations, including 
ENISA, the European Centre for Cyber Crime (EC3), which falls under 
Europol, the European Defence Agency (EDA), and the European Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU).
A number of countries, including the Netherlands, have signed a letter of 
intent for a European Cyber Rapid Response Force to respond quickly in the 
event of a large-scale digital incident.58
The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-
wide partnership of CERTs.
56 Boin & Lodge, 2018.
57 Backman & Rhinard, 2018.
58 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-international-cyberspace-policy/47525/new-tool-address-cyber-
threats-eus-rapid-response-force_en. Compare the proposal for a European cyber agency in CEPS, 
2018. This agency also has the authority to attribute attacks.
59 h t tps : / /www.enisa .europa .eu/news/enisa-news/cs i r t s -and- inc ident - response- 
capabilities-in-europe
60 European Commission, 2016.
61 Boin & Lodge, 2018; cf. European Commission, 2016: 2.
62 Implemented in the Netherlands through the Network and Information Systems Security Act (17 
October 2018, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2018, 387). https://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0041515/2018-11-09
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member states have therefore asked the European Commission to produce plans for 
responding to a major cyber incident involving multiple member states. In the 
meantime, the ‘blueprint’63 outlines what a timely and effective response would 
look like. Practice exercises are needed, and since the blueprint does not provide 
any new legal powers, combating incidents will still fall on national crisis manage-
ment mechanisms. The question is whether these are still fit for purpose.
4.4.3  Setting Priorities
Not all instruments and resources can be deployed simultaneously. Some areas will 
have to be prioritized, again pointing to the importance of clearly defined decision- 
making powers. There are questions about when the government should deploy 
which instruments, the most effective use of resources, and the relationship between 
detecting and counteracting incidents on the one hand and legal powers on the other. 
Many governments are also working to improve the categorization of cyber incidents.
63 See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/NL/C-2017-6100-F1-NL-MAIN- 
PART-1.PDF. A blueprint is also attached to the document. See: http://ec.europa.eu/transpar-
ency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/NL/C-2017-6100-F1-NL-ANNEX-1-PART-1.PDF
64 Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, 2018: 140.




The United Kingdom has recently developed a system of six categories of 
incidents, covering the entire spectrum from local incidents to national emer-
gencies. The British National Cyber Security Centre links each category to a 
party responsible for responding to the incident.66
France is considering classifying cyber-attacks according to specific 
response options.64 The United States has had such a system since 2014, 
where The National Cyber Security and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) reports incidents and assesses risks by assigning a score between 1 
and 100 based on 8 criteria:




type of information that has been lost, compromised or corrupted;
recovery options;
cross-sectoral dependencies;
extent of societal disruption.65
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While the Dutch government’s assessment of incident severity is linked to its list 
of critical infrastructure, the examples above show the usefulness of additional cri-
teria for combating digital incidents. For starters, the national government would 
not have to be involved in all incidents. A more differentiated classification system 
could form the basis for a more clearly defined division of responsibilities, both 
within the various layers of government (such as the national cyber security author-
ity, government departments, safety regions, and municipal information security 
services) and between government bodies and the business community. A more 
nuanced classification system for cyber incidents would allow for more effective 
responses, as action by the central government would no longer have to be directly 
linked to incidents involving critical infrastructure.
Prioritization also needs to occur on the spot. In the event of a major fire, the fire 
brigade can choose to put out the fire or to minimize damage by keeping nearby 
buildings wet; adjacent buildings may suffer water damage, but would be salvaged. 
Something similar may apply to disconnecting digital systems, requiring the assess-
ment of the risks of acute interruption to operations and the risks of problems 
spreading further, possibly leading to broader damage. Because many digital sys-
tems are in the hands of private parties, the considerations the government will 
consider when intervening must be clear in advance.
Prioritization involves both technical and substantive aspects. On the technical 
side, the logic of the systems will play a role. This means that decisions regarding 
connecting and disconnecting networks will be based on a particular sequencing; 
here it is essential to know how the various systems and organizations in a network 
are connected. In terms of content, there is the question of which processes should 
be kept operating the longest and be restarted first in the event of failure. The gov-
ernment’s choices will not always be self-explanatory to all parties. Private actors 
may want to safeguard their own systems and those of their clients first, rather than 
prioritizing the public interest.
In the Netherlands, the continuity of critical processes is given priority in the 
event of an incident. Critical processes that fall under category A (the disruption of 
which would have severe economic and societal impact) are prioritized over those 
in category B (the disruption of which would have a more limited, but still 
Following the EU blueprint for preventing incidents, the European NIS 
cooperation group67 has drawn up a taxonomy of large-scale cyber incidents.68 
Alongside malicious acts, it includes spontaneous system failure, natural phe-
nomena such as fires, floods and earthquakes, human error, and failures by 
third parties. The aim is to link this taxonomy to integrated EU political crisis 
response (IPCR) regulations.
67 The NIS cooperation group consists of representatives of EU member states, ENISA and the 
European Commission. It was established on the basis of Article 11 of the NIS Directive.
68 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2018-30/cybersecurity_
incident_taxonomy_00CD828C-F851-AFC4-0B1B416696B5F710_53646.pdf
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substantial economic and societal impact). Digitization challenges this categoriza-
tion. For digital facilities, the current list of critical infrastructure focuses mainly on 
traditional telecommunications services and their role in for instance the deploy-
ment of emergency services and communication between emergency services. The 
telecoms/IT sectors, however, fall under category B. Whether this is sustainable is 
doubtful. Second only to the power supply, the failure of digital facilities would 
likely lead to the most significant cascade effects. There are detailed shutdown and 
recovery plans for electricity companies, with the restoration of public order and 
safety being priorities. No such plans are in place for digital disruption, again under-
lining the importance of rethinking our definition of critical processes.
4.5  Recovery & Reconstruction
The final phase in dealing with digital disruption concerns recovery and reconstruc-
tion – the resumption of normal functioning. If normal everyday life is seriously 
disrupted, various steps will be required to get things working normally again. Often 
things will not return to how they were before the disruption because people and 
organizations learn from the incident. Companies and organizations affected by a 
computer virus or ransomware, or which have experienced system and process fail-
ures for other reasons, often alter their policies (for example staff only using USB 
sticks under strict conditions). To learn from such incidents, we must analyse what 
went wrong. The recovery and reconstruction process also requires adequate facili-
ties. This means, for example, that victims are compensated for damages. Learning 
lessons and providing compensation are to some extent related. Those who wish to 
redesign core societal processes must have the resources to do this.
4.5.1  Evaluating and Learning Lessons
The recovery and reconstruction phase must be used to reflect on how new digital 
facilities are to be embedded. This may extend to rethinking the balance between 
economic interests and political and administrative authority in the organization of 
the digital society. Changing priorities may mean developing facilities that privilege 
security over speed, efficiency, and low prices.
We need more than reorientation; past incidents must lead to concrete learning.69 
This often does not happen, even in the aftermath of major incidents such as 
NotPetya and WannaCry.70 The availability of historical data on cyber incidents is 
limited; there is currently no generally accepted definition of what constitutes an 
incident.71 An additional problem is that most data on incidents does not concern 
69 Van Vollenhoven, 2018.
70 Van Tiel, 2019.
71 Valeriano & Maness, 2018.
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vulnerabilities that could lead to societal disruption. Public data on incidents tends 
to focus on data breaches because legal disclosure requirements focus on them.72 
The Network and Information Security Directive will change this by introducing a 
reporting obligation for problems that affect the continuity of ‘essential services’. 
The European Payment Directive will also require payment service providers to 
report major incidents that jeopardize the financial interests of their users. As both 
reporting obligations have been introduced very recently, it is too early to draw 
meaningful conclusions.
As for the supervision of digital security, the Netherlands still lacks a designated 
supervisor.73 Several organizations are active in specific, limited areas: the Data 
Protection Authority registers data breaches; De Nederlandsche Bank (the central 
bank) protects electronic payment transactions; the Telecommunications Agency 
monitors network providers. Several government departments are also involved as 
their remits cover critical sectors. The incident data that each of these organizations 
collects is only haphazardly shared and not always analysed, let alone in a coordi-
nated manner.74 This is a missed opportunity. Because digital disruptions always 
involve multiple organizations and sectors, it would be extremely useful to compare 
data on incidents.
4.5.2  Compensation
An important aspect of recovery and reconstruction is compensation to victims, 
whether through liability insurance or government payments. Adequate compensa-
tion reduces risks and damages to society75 and contributes to the recovery of the 
economy, social stability and trust in institutions.76 In principle, it is possible to 
insure against cyber risks.77 As the market for cyber insurance is a fraction of the 
market for other risks, we may see considerable growth in this area.
Risks are insurable if they can be quantified in terms of their probability and 
impact. It must also be possible to draw on a sufficiently large group of individuals 
affected by the risk, who would therefore be willing to share it. Finally, risks need to 
be unpredictable in terms of when and where they materialize, and be beyond the 
control of the insured parties. Otherwise, each party would insure itself individually.
72 OECD, 2017: 34. For an indication of the number of data breaches, see: https://autoriteitperson-
aldata.nl/nl/onderwerpen/security/meldplicht-datalekken/Digits-datalekken-2018. The Dutch 
Data Protection Authority received more than 20,000 reports of data breaches in 2018. In 2017, 
there were 10,009 reports; in 2016, 5849 reports.
73 This is a more general problem. See Van Vollenhoven, 2018.
74 One exception is the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, which provides an 
overview of reports and incidents in an appendix to the Netherlands Cyber Security Assessment. 
See NCTV, 2019: 43–46.
75 Bruggeman & Faure, 2018: 11; WRR, 2011b: 16, 53.
76 Kuipers & Tjepkema, 2017.
77 OECD, 2017; Biener et al., 2015.
4.5  Recovery & Reconstruction
52
Cyber risks are difficult to quantify due to lack of historical data. We have no clear 
method for classifying incidents and no insight into the resilience of companies and 
the types of losses they incur.78 Cyber risks are also constantly evolving, complicating 
quantification. Insurers could face massive losses due to the accumulation of risks.79 
If many parties depend on the same infrastructure or suppliers, or use the same basic 
software, insurers will have difficulty pooling the risks across sectors or regions. 
Lloyd’s and Cyence have estimated a cloud software service outage, depending on its 
duration, to cause between $4.6 billion and $53 billion in damages.80 The accumula-
tion of risks is a major reason the market for cyber insurance is growing so slowly. 
The extensive damage (see table below) and damage claims resulting from NotPetya 
are additional reasons for large insurers to limit their coverage of cyber incidents.
Impact of Interruption to Business Operations Due to the NotPetya Incident81
 
These insurance companies felt emboldened by the United States’ attribution of 
the cyber-attack to Russia.82 They also explicitly excluded alternative cover from 
their policies, for example through liability for or damage to company equipment 
(so-called ‘silent cyber’).
78 OECD, 2017; ENISA, 2017; Nieuwesteeg et al., 2017. Many insurance policies focus on the loss 
of customer data and not on the cost of repairing digital infrastructure and losses due to disruption 
of business.
79 OECD, 2017: 123.
80 Lloyd’s & Cyence, 2017.
81 AON, 2019: 8. Based on corporate quarterly figures.
82 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html
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Damage due to armed conflicts cannot be insured by law, due to the excessive 
financial risk. This causes few problems when war remains a distant prospect and 
there is a clear definition of ‘armed conflict’. But cyber-attacks, which enable coun-
tries to harm each other’s interests without ever setting foot on their soil, cannot be 
placed in this category so easily. A further question is whether and when computer 
code can be considered a ‘weapon’, particularly given the rapid evolution of mal-
ware. Most problematically, it is unclear when cyber-attacks merit retaliation; there 
are no international rules or definitions to determine this.83 Now that insurers see 
cyber-attacks as a form of armed conflict and companies are protesting against this 
move, it is up to the legal system to determine the extent to which a cyber-attack 
carried out by a foreign state is, in fact, an act of war.84
The handling of other major incidents shows that solutions exist. After the 9/11 
attacks, insurers withdrew because they no longer wanted to compensate clients for 
losses due to terrorist incidents. It is likewise almost impossible to insure against 
flooding in the Netherlands, although a public-private arrangement now provides 
insurance against terrorism, for which insurers are not required to compensate all 
losses and for which the government acts as the guarantor of last resort.85 Similar 
public-private arrangements are found in Belgium and Germany. Such constructions 
enable insurers to offer insurance products without unacceptably high financial risks 
for themselves. Applied to digital disruption, it would mean that the government 
provides compensation for damages exceeding a certain limit. Once this guarantee 
has been provided, insurers could expand the market for cyber security risks and 
companies would, in principle, be liable for the costs of smaller incidents.
4.6  Conclusion
The government and other parties have always taken steps to minimize the potential 
consequences of societal disruption. Digitization adds a new form of disruption to 
the list of risks we are already familiar with. This section has focused on contin-
gency measures in anticipation of digital disruption. Our main conclusion is that 
these measures have yet to be adequately implemented and that the government and 
other parties are insufficiently prepared. A number of steps are required:
• There is currently no coherent policy for critical infrastructure: for back-up 
options, the isolation of chains and networks, for cyber exercises, and for provid-
ing information on how to respond to urgent incidents. While regulations diverge 
between sectors and organizations, other factors undermine our preparedness as 
a society. Back-up options disappear as analogue systems are decommissioned 
83 Mačák, 2017.
84 Several companies currently have legal cases against insurance companies, which may require 
judges to decide whether cyber-attacks are in fact a form of ‘armed conflict’.
85 For an extensive discussion of both attempts to insure against the risk of flooding and the terror-
ism pool, see Bruggeman & Faure, 2018: 61–62, 70–72.
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and organizations outsource important facilities to third parties, further increas-
ing the interdependence between processes and sectors.
• Information sharing has recently improved and become much more comprehen-
sive. But it is still hampered by sectoral divisions and a partly outdated distinction 
between critical and non-critical providers. This means that signals may not be 
picked up (or picked up too late) by the relevant actors. A broader perspective is 
needed for gathering and sharing knowledge. While the current focus is on digital 
security measures, vulnerabilities and incidents, there is much less clarity for ser-
vice providers and governments when it comes to chains, networks and the depen-
dencies they create. This kind of knowledge is essential if we want to be able to 
classify the severity of incidents and manage the spread of digital disruption.
• In combating digital disruption, the government depends on information and 
cooperation from private actors (many of them based overseas). But the govern-
ment lacks any clearly defined authority to intervene on the basis of specific 
categories of digital incidents; there is also little clarity about which public bod-
ies should take action for which type of incident. Greater powers for the govern-
ment should be accompanied by adequate protection for private parties, as 
interventions based on coercion may have adverse financial effects.
• Digital disruption can cross national borders, calling for international coordina-
tion. The current approach relies on partly inadequate national mechanisms, 
which is particularly risky in light of the spill-over effects into critical infrastruc-
ture elsewhere in Europe and attacks on European institutions. The need for 
European and international cooperation is urgent due to the geopolitical dynam-
ics that surround digital disruption.
• Recovery and reconstruction would currently be difficult to achieve. The funds 
required for recovery would be in short supply now that insurers seem to be 
withdrawing from the cyber insurance market. But other major incidents of dam-
age show that solutions are possible. While learning from incidents requires 
wide-ranging reflection and analysis, this is currently limited by various supervi-
sory authorities processing the available data on incidents in isolation, preclud-
ing the benefits of potential learning effects.
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On 24 June 2019, an hour-long outage hit the Dutch emergency number 112 and 
0900–8844, the national police telephone line. It was also impossible to contact 
hospitals, municipalities, and companies for some time. The primary system of 
KPN – the telecom provider – was out of action while three back-up systems failed. 
The incident, which according to KPN was probably due to software error, once 
again revealed the vulnerability of facilities in the physical world to digital failures. 
It also underlined the report’s central message: the need to be better prepared for 
incidents involving a digital dimension. These incidents are all the more critical 
when they are not limited to the digital domain, but have potentially disruptive con-
sequences in the physical world and for confidence in the core institutions of society.
This incident in the Netherlands made it painfully clear how much the govern-
ment depends on private parties for the continuity of critical processes, and how 
much these private parties depend on the services and facilities of external suppli-
ers. Even more worryingly, the authorities, including the central government, were 
insufficiently prepared. There was no off-the-shelf emergency plan for an outage of 
the emergency number, while parties were unable to communicate to coordinate 
their response. It took 75 min before an alternative emergency number was distrib-
uted; an incorrect number was given out first, and not everyone received a notifica-
tion from NL-Alert, the Dutch digital alarm system, on their mobile device. There 
had already been problems with the emergency number in 2012. The government 
minister responsible at the time had issued reassurances that this would not happen 
again. And yet it happened, showing that no system is 100% fail-safe. Apparently, 
even identical forms of disruption cannot be ruled out.
The previous sections focused on society’s preparedness for digital disruption. 
We then analysed why the existing set of instruments does not adequately address 
such forms of disruption. In this concluding section, we offer suggestions for steps 
to improve our preparedness. These are intended for the government, particularly 
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for the national government. Since many other national governments around the 
world face similar challenges, our recommendations will, at least in some form, 
apply to them too. Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 present our main conclusions. The sub-
sequent sections contain our recommendations, which we discuss based on the four 
stages of preparedness, detection, mitigation, and recovery and reconstruction.
5.2  New Types of Disruption
The phenomenon of societal disruption has always been with us and can have a 
range of causes. Increasingly, the disruption or failure of digital services and facili-
ties is one of these causes. This report has left aside questions about the likelihood 
and probable impact of digital disruption; such risk assessments are already avail-
able. As evidenced by numerous incidents in the Netherlands and elsewhere, the 
probability that digital disruption will occur is high enough to warrant planning how 
we will respond. The growing scale, spread and impact of digital incidents, their 
rising costs and economic implications, means that the trust that citizens, organiza-
tions and companies have in digital technologies is at stake.
Given the dependence on advanced digital technology across the breadth of our 
society and economy, the consequences of disruption go beyond the domain of ‘tradi-
tional’ information technology and cyber security. Digitization has blurred the distinc-
tion between the ‘digital realm’ and the ‘physical realm’. The boundaries between 
companies and organizations  – now interconnected by countless systems and net-
works – have become more diffuse. Digital disruption today means much more than 
the failure of isolated digital systems. This new reality, however, is not adequately 
acknowledged by companies, organizations, the government and politicians.
More and more societal and economic processes are based on interconnected 
flows of data and information. Developments such as ‘datafication’, the huge 
increase in the power and capabilities of computers, and the complex web of inter-
connections between systems around the world mean that the physical realm is now 
inextricably bound up with the digital realm. Virtually all of society’s core pro-
cesses – including our power supply, the processing of payments, flood defences 
and healthcare systems – now depend on the exchange of data and digital systems 
linked to wider networks including the internet. Interdependence is therefore built-
 in and must be considered, both when preparing for and combating incidents that 
involve our digital infrastructure. It is no longer sufficient to leave the implementa-
tion of protection measures to individual organizations, or for them to practise 
responding to cyber incidents within their own company or sector. The weakest link 
in the chain, which could allow an incident to occur, could be almost anywhere in 
the world.
Digitization is changing the scale and dynamics of disruptive incidents. This is 
due not only to the highly interconnected nature of digital infrastructure, but to the 
use of unsafe, generic software and hardware, network dependencies, and the some-
times inadequate protection of systems and data. Complex, often opaque and 
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cross-border production and supply chains provide malicious actors with myriad 
opportunities to disrupt social and economic processes, or even to bring them to a 
halt. Digital disruption can occur at lightning speed, affecting a large number of 
organizations and sectors around the world; it can also result from dormant pro-
cesses that go unnoticed for long periods of time or are unclear in scope. Both may 
shake confidence in our state institutions, democracy and constitution, as members 
of society perceive the government has insufficient control over the digital realm. If 
disruption strikes, it is not clear in advance whether it is the government’s responsi-
bility to take action, and if so, which part of government. And yet, a swift response 
may be required to limit the damage.
Digitization has in many ways undermined the relevance of geographical bor-
ders. Numerous incidents have shown that problems can simultaneously lead to 
disruption in many countries. Digital disruption must therefore be addressed by 
international bodies, including the European Union. But cross-border digitization 
does not mean that individual countries have no role in addressing its attendant 
threats. Some disruptions are limited to the national level, such as the disruption of 
KPN’s telephone system in the Netherlands. One key lesson is that digital disrup-
tion  – however abstract it may seem  – will ultimately always have local conse-
quences. Finally, for contingency measures from fall-back options and disconnection 
scenarios to insurance and compensation, individual countries depend on other 
nations. In short, preparedness for digital disruption must combine national mea-
sures with international cooperation and coordination.
5.3  Centralized Setting of Standards and Coordination 
by Government
In security policy, the government is expected to clarify what interests are at stake. 
It needs to clarify how costs, benefits, and risks are distributed in light of these inter-
ests, and which parties bear responsibility for what.1 Extending this line of reason-
ing, government must play a greater role in the digital domain and in addressing its 
associated risks.
This role requires explanation. A centralized system of management for cyber 
security, internet governance and critical infrastructure – populated largely by pri-
vate actors – is unrealistic. But the government can play its role in other ways. Over 
the past decade, cyber security has emerged as a serious international policy field. 
Public-private partnerships have become indispensable, especially now that most of 
our digital infrastructure is in private hands. This collaboration, however, is largely 
free of legal obligations. Providers of critical services are largely free to determine 
their own protection measures and back-up and fall-back options; their 
preparedness for digital disruption varies considerably. They also have great latitude 
1 WRR, 2011.
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in reporting incidents, while active participation in the Information Sharing Analysis 
Centres is mainly limited to the select group of organizations that have acknowl-
edged the importance of sharing information.
Private companies and organizations cannot be expected to assume full responsibility 
for digital disruption. But when it does occur, they can be expected to do everything in 
their powers to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. While the government is, 
by definition, best placed to enforce this responsibility, it now only has a limited set of 
instruments to do so. Should private organizations and companies refuse to cooperate in 
the event of disruption (or imminent disruption), the central government has relatively 
limited powers to force cooperation. This is even more the case at the European level, as 
the EU is limited to an advisory role and the strategic and operational aspects of cyber 
are the responsibility of the member states. Clarifying and strengthening the powers 
available to government as well as standards for intervention2 would enhance the gov-
ernment’s capacity to act in the event of digital disruption.
Nevertheless, the starting point must be that local ‘fire brigades’ take care of 
local fires and specialist fire brigades take care of more complex fires at the local, 
regional or national levels. After all, different measures will often be required in 
each domain. If there is a risk of digital disruption, escalation to a higher adminis-
trative level can be considered and central government can decide to take the lead in 
crisis management. The division of responsibilities for digital incidents remains 
unclear in many countries. Partly because there are no criteria to distinguish between 
different categories of incidents, there are no mechanisms in place for how and 
when higher authorities step in.
The threat of digital disruption requires coordinated action from government. 
Due to both network effects and the interaction between the digital and physical 
realms, contingency plans must transcend individual organizations. It is virtually 
impossible for any organization, company or safety region to have a comprehensive 
picture, let alone enough information to make the right decisions about the deactiva-
tion of networks, escalation, or the many other urgent measures that may be required. 
An overview of the coherence of processes, of the dependencies involved, and of the 
measures to be taken requires coordinated action by government. So does providing 
the right public information when things go wrong. The government also remains 
responsible for existing resources in the field of cyber security.3
Better preparedness by the government cannot be a license for other actors to 
take unnecessary risks. Companies and organizations have their share of responsi-
bility in preparing for digital disruption. If they fail to act on their responsibilities, 
this may undermine public confidence in digital processes, which in the long run 
will adversely affect the functioning of society, market and government. Even if 
only one party decides that preparatory measures are not worth the bother, all will 
be affected when things go wrong.
2 Cf. Boeke, 2016
3 Such as the public information provided on https://crisis.nl/wees-voorbereid/cyberaanval/. 
Suggestions for cyber-attacks are limited to ‘digital’ measures such as changing passwords and 
installing new antivirus software. In the event of a multi-day failure of the national card payment 
system, citizens would benefit more from advice to keep cash ready for emergencies.
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Some measures are already in place to coordinate our preparedness for digital 
disruption. For example, parties who fail to take precautions to limit adverse effects, 
or who do so inadequately, can in some cases be held liable.4 But there is plenty of 
scope for improvement among private-sector actors, such as organizing cyber exer-
cises and drills for disruption in light of network effects and dependence on external 
parties. Companies and organizations could also be required to include a section on 
cyber security in their annual reports, focusing on preparatory measures and precau-
tions. A number of our recommendations concern the private sector.
5.4  Focusing on Preparedness
Governments have long been protecting the infrastructure necessary for society’s 
continuity. This requires an understanding of how particular infrastructures are vul-
nerable to disruption, failure or destruction. While anyone familiar with these vul-
nerabilities can take precautionary measures to minimize the consequences of 
disruptive events, at present not enough is being done.
This report is underpinned by the conviction that the possibility of digital disrup-
tion is not being taken seriously enough. The current policy focus on prevention and 
protection is too limited and could have grave consequences. First, there has been 
no public or political debate about which facilities are essential to ensure cyber 
security in the Netherlands, or about the most effective approach to take in the event 
of digital disruption. Our first recommendation is therefore:
Digitization increasingly determines the vulnerability of core societal processes. 
Public debate is needed about how much ‘strategic autonomy’ is desirable and fea-
sible for an individual nation state. While digitization leads to faster and more effi-
cient processes, incidents can quickly affect multiple organizations, sectors and 
countries. What is the right balance between the advantages and disadvantages of 
digitization? If things go wrong, what fall-back options should be available? How 
long can a disruption reasonably last? What recovery time would we find acceptable?
Market developments affect the preparedness of society and government. 
Investment decisions, corporate take-overs and network effects in the digital world 
result in dependencies which can be difficult to mitigate. These dependencies can 
also hinder the government’s implementation of its own safety measures. An impor-
tant question is therefore which facilities or companies we wish to keep within our 
own jurisdictions in order to protect the national and/or European interest. The 
4 Van Dam, 1995; Keirse, 2017




implications of relying on overseas actors and entities for the effectiveness of our 
approach to digital disruption should be given more weight in this discussion.
More than is currently the case, governments will need to build up the knowledge 
required to identify the risks of this new reality early on, and to formulate policies 
on digital disruption. This would entail evaluation of how far we wish to have fall- 
back options available, such as the ability to isolate systems and facilities so that 
they can continue to function offline.5
5.5  Detection: A Clearer Picture of Dependencies
Preparedness and problem detection are closely intertwined. We need a clearer pic-
ture of the dependencies between the digital and physical realms, and within spe-
cific sectors of society. This will require greater efforts from government. We need 
to revisit the list of critical infrastructure as what we have now is insufficiently 
attuned to the realities of the digital world. How we prioritize critical processes will 
have to be reviewed.
5.5.1  Insight into Dependencies
Detecting digital disruption at an early stage will require detailed understanding of 
the connections between cyber and physical sectors. It will also require better 
insight into the chains and networks – indispensable for the core processes of soci-
ety – within which Dutch and other national and international organizations operate. 
We need to know who owns, or is allowed to own, shares in these organizations, and 
who has formal or effective control over shareholders.6 We need a more comprehen-
sive overview of various sectors – including their possible dominance by particular 
service providers – and the jurisdictions in which key providers and other players 
are based to facilitate international consultation should rapid measures be neces-
sary. In the absence of such knowledge, risks cannot be rigorously evaluated, infor-
mation on incidents cannot be properly interpreted, and our preparations for digital 
disruption will fall short. Our second recommendation is therefore to:
5 Cf. WRR, 2017: 67–77, 186.
6 Bulten et al., 2017.
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Such a ‘dependency assessment’ will augment cyber security assessments by 
various countries that annually review major incidents, threats, interests and resil-
ience.7 Given the sensitivity of the information, the details should not be published. 
What matters is that the information is used to better understand incidents and deci-
sions, both before and during episodes of disruption. The information can also be 
used to inform strategic discussions and choices about how far social and economic 
provisions in the country depend on specific actors.
Our recommendation to conduct a cyber-dependency assessment refers specifi-
cally to companies and organizations involved in critical processes. Other compa-
nies and organizations can of course conduct such assessments as well, particularly 
if they play key roles in the functioning of society, for example hospitals, distribu-
tion services and payment platforms. Keeping abreast of evolving dependencies is 
primarily the responsibility of private companies, public services and individual 
organizations; they will need to periodically refresh their knowledge in light of 
economic and technological developments. While exercises for scenarios involving 
digital disruption are an obvious tool, they remain rare and may need to become 
mandatory, certainly for critical infrastructure.
At the same time, preparation for digital disruption will have to transcend the 
capacities of individual organizations. Even where parties have detailed knowledge 
of their own dependencies, the wider picture for the sector and interrelationships 
with other domains may be much less clear. The entire public sector should be 
involved to yield a more comprehensive picture. For example, we know that many 
companies and organizations depend on the cloud services of just two major US 
providers: Microsoft and Amazon. The same applies to reliance on suppliers of 
industrial control systems, electronic patient records and ATMs. But we do not 
know enough about the sum of these dependencies or their significance for particu-
lar organizations and sectors, or even for the country as a whole. This also applies 
to the question of exactly what processes are at stake. We need to know more about 
the wider context to be able to identify risks and to prepare for disruption.
5.5.2  A New Approach to the Identification 
of Critical Infrastructure
A comprehensive overview of dependencies would provide a better understanding 
of which organizations require a higher level of protection and government support, 
including the sharing of information about risks. In many countries, these organiza-
tions are based on lists of critical infrastructure. These lists are invaluable; their 
exact composition is a key determinant of how well countries are prepared for digi-
tal disruption.
7 Most recently: https://www.ncsc.nl/onderwerpen_a_z/csbn/index.aspx
5.5 Detection: A Clearer Picture of Dependencies
66
The selection of critical processes is politically challenging, partly because pro-
tecting them is costly and the government often has no direct control over the parties 
involved. The current ‘system’ works primarily to the benefit of the central govern-
ment and those organizations designated as critical providers. Parties not on the list 
need to make their own arrangements. In a highly networked world, this has undeni-
able consequences, both nationally and internationally, not least for those parties 
designated as constituting critical infrastructure.
The first reason to revisit our current list of critical infrastructure is the increas-
ingly crucial role of digital processes in society. This includes stand-alone digital 
services such as electronic message traffic and authentication as well as processes 
that support other critical functions such as the supply of electricity and payment 
traffic. Although some have been added to the list of critical infrastructures in recent 
years, the question is whether this is sufficient. Due to the rapid development and 
wide adoption of digital applications in many areas of society, new and significant 
vulnerabilities arise unexpectedly, requiring the inclusion of new organizations as 
providers of critical services. An example is the payment service Facebook is plan-
ning to launch.
Second, we need to examine whether it remains useful to link critical processes 
to individual providers. There is ample reason to believe that identifying the chains 
and networks that support critical processes – meaning all those parties that provid-
ers of the service depend on  – would yield better results. This might mean that 
actors other than the direct providers of critical services should also be categorized 
as critical infrastructure. In short, the policy on critical processes will need to clarify 
how actors deemed ‘critical’ fit into the relevant chain or network, based on the 
principle that some components are indispensable for the continuity of a given criti-
cal process. The example of the electricity supply (discussed in Sect. 5.4) shows that 
incidents that affect actors not classified as critical providers can contribute to dis-
ruption through cascade effects. If an incident outside of the critical sector is not 
addressed in time, the critical infrastructure itself may be affected.
The cross-border nature of many chains and networks has implications for 
European harmonization in the protection of critical infrastructure. Greater focus is 
required at the European level on the links between providers designated as critical, 
between themselves and with external parties. At the same time, greater commit-
ment is required from EU member states. The different ways in which countries 
govern critical sectors and the services covered by the Network and Information 
Security Directive make it difficult to work together to identify and mitigate cross- 
border incidents and those that affect European networks and institutions. For 
example, while the NIS Directive includes measures for the healthcare sector, the 
Netherlands did not include healthcare when implementing the Directive in its leg-
islation on network and information systems security (the WBNI). This means that, 
in the event of an incident, there is no common point of contact for member states 
in the field of healthcare. Such omissions hamper the creation of a Europe-wide 
system for the entire system of critical infrastructure.
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5.5.3  Digital Triage
In the Netherlands, the list of critical processes – last reviewed in 2014 – includes 
criteria for prioritization in case of disruption. On the basis of various impact crite-
ria, the list distinguishes between two categories of critical processes, prioritizing 
those with the greatest impact – due to for instance cascade effects – should they 
fail. While prioritization can limit damage and promote swift recovery, we need to 
review the existing categorization of critical processes in light of digitization. We 
refer to this prioritization process as ‘digital triage’.8 Even where, as in many other 
countries, no distinctions are drawn between critical processes, their digitization 
requires revisiting which ones to prioritize in case of disruption.
The question is whether the current system is adequate given our growing depen-
dence on digital technology. The prioritization of critical processes based on ‘impact’ 
may also need revisiting; in a crisis situation, the most important processes for a rapid 
recovery may be quite different from those that have the greatest impact. The continuity 
of many critical processes depends on digital facilities and services, which may warrant 
higher priority as they facilitate the restoration of other important societal functions. 
Digital communication facilities in particular may deserve higher priority as they play a 
key role in keeping citizens informed and in preventing or containing social unrest.
Digital triage based on this dual perspective – including both impact and recov-
ery options – would, in the event of a crisis, enable ministers to take decisions that 
have already been discussed and accepted in advance. During a disruptive event, 
there may not be time for any reflective decision-making. Such a system of triage 
would mean that the parties involved are informed in advance; they would not be 
taken by surprise and would be able to act more quickly. This would ultimately 
improve the resilience of society’s critical functions.9
As the Dutch government’s dependence on Microsoft during the DigiNotar inci-
dent revealed, it is an illusion to think that the government is the only key actor in 
this area. Other actors often participate in the decision-making necessary to combat 
8 The term ‘triage’ comes from the French verb trier, meaning to rank. Its usage can be traced to 
the work of field nurses in Napoleon’s army, who developed a method of evaluating injuries and 
evacuating patients following battle (Baker, 2007). The concept has been applied to cyber security 
analysts detecting and monitoring networks (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015; Zhong et al., 2018). 
The digital triage we propose extends beyond the digital domain to identifying priorities when 
restoring vital societal processes in a digitizing society.
9 Verner et al., 2017
Operationalize critical infrastructure differently, starting with the chains 
and networks that support critical processes.
Examine whether digitization requires changes to the prioritization of criti-
cal processes.
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digital disruption and to enable swift recovery. Good communication channels with 
these parties is essential to guarantee the continued functioning of society during a 
crisis. The assessment of dependencies discussed above would be useful here.
5.6  Mitigation: More Powers, Better Categorization 
of Incidents and Better European Coordination
If things go wrong unexpectedly, the government must be able to bring the situation 
under control. But as things currently stand, the government would face several 
problems. First, there is no equivalent to the familiar emergency services model in 
our new digitized reality. Second, there is no clear categorization of incidents that 
outlines when the relevant authorities and actors should become involved. Third, 
dealing with disruptive events with a cross-border or European dimension are ham-
pered by lack of coordination.
5.6.1  Legal Powers and Competencies
When digital disruption threatens societal disruption, the government must have the 
right information at its disposal and be ready to act. Action may have to be far- 
reaching. During the DigiNotar incident in 2011, the Dutch government stepped in 
because the extent of the problem was unclear and confidence in its own digital 
services was at stake. Unfortunately, the government’s actions during the DigiNotar 
incident were never evaluated. The question of which powers the government actu-
ally needs has therefore never been properly debated – an important conversation to 
have as the government can now only legally provide advice and assistance. This 
means that organizations and companies are not obliged to follow the government’s 
advice when dealing with digital disruption, and may decide to pursue priorities that 
conflict with the public interest. Where organizations and companies are not part of 
the critical infrastructure, the government is largely powerless.
Although the government has a range of options for intervening based on exist-
ing crisis management legislation, there is no specific focus on how it should handle 
digital disruption. Current crisis decision-making is organized along functional 
lines or linked to a particular municipality, region or the central government. 
Although the central government can always intervene in the event of an emergency, 
it would be preferable if interventions occurred in a predictable and controlled man-
ner, particularly if it concerns the police or the public prosecution service. A crucial 
question is whether such interventions would be justifiable if they did not also serve 
the purposes of an investigation or prosecution. After all, we rightly expect the fire 
brigade to extinguish the fire, not to confiscate our household effects. In a digitized 
world, this distinction becomes more difficult to draw because data does not need to 
be removed to be reused for other purposes. Our recommendation is therefore to:
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Generic, legally established powers, accompanied by an appropriate framework, 
would give the government more freedom to act to combat digital disruption. The aim 
should be to safeguard citizens and businesses from disproportionate, uncontrolled or 
arbitrary acts on the part of government.10 Such a framework would be particularly 
important if there is a risk of disruption but the effects cannot yet be discerned.
5.6.2  Towards a Categorization of Incidents
In elaborating the government’s legal powers, it would be preferable to specify them 
on the basis of different categories of digital incidents. Such a system is already in 
place in the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Not all categories of inci-
dents disrupt critical processes or represent a threat to national security. A more 
detailed system of categorization would facilitate assessing the potential consequences 
of an incident, the need to use special powers, and the decision to deploy a particular 
organization to take action. Differentiation according to the seriousness of situations 
could also prevent the central government from becoming involved too quickly. An 
effective system of categorization would provide opportunities for administrative and 
political escalation. Our response to fires is essentially decentralized; escalating the 
response is possible when the magnitude of the incident requires it.
5.6.3  European Coordination
Given the cross-border nature of digital disruption, the recommendations outlined 
above for combating incidents should be on the international agenda as well. The 
European Union is an obvious starting point, now that the NIS Directive provides 
for greater uniformity in the protection of service providers in critical processes. To 
effectively combat digital disruption, individual countries will often depend on 
cooperation from foreign governments. Other countries will also ask it for assistance.
Individual EU member states can contribute to a more coordinated approach at 
the European level by bolstering the NIS cooperation group.11 The NIS cooperation 
group was established as part of the implementation of the NIS Directive and is 
10 WRR, 2016: 97.
11 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/nis-cooperation-group
Provide a clearly defined legal mandate for a digital taskforce responsible for 
combating (potential) digital disruption that could have adverse effects on 
society. As part of this, examine the need for separate regulations for govern-
ment action to prevent incidents from escalating and for categorizing incidents.
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supported by the national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), 
the European Commission and the ENISA agency. Like the European Article 29 
Working Group, which has since been succeeded by the legally constituted European 
Data Protection Board,12 this partnership could eventually serve as a stepping stone 
towards an organization with greater legal competencies at the EU level. Those 
competencies should focus on combating incidents that affect European institutions 
or that transcend the capacities of individual member states to such an extent that 
they pose risks to critical infrastructure elsewhere in Europe.13
5.7  Recovery & Reconstruction: Examine the Possibility 
of a Cyber Pool and Make Better Use of Data 
on Incidents
A disruptive event is often followed by a period of recovery and reconstruction. A 
range of issues will need to be addressed, from support and compensation for vic-
tims to evaluating what went wrong. We recommend adding two further issues to 
the agenda relevant to recovery after a major incident. First, we should look closely 
at the feasibility of establishing a cyber pool for compensating damages. Second, 
we can learn how to better use the available data on incidents.
5.7.1  Cyber Pool
An important aspect of recovery and reconstruction is compensating victims in the 
form of liability or compensation payments, whether through insurance or through 
government payments.14 The aim of such instruments is to enable parties that suffer 
damage to resume normal functioning wherever possible and, preferably, to return 
to their previous positions. The reality is often different, if only because countless 
questions arise about the attribution and causes of the damage or, for example, at 
which moment the damage should be assessed.15
Liability, compensation and insurability are difficult to design and regulate in a 
digitizing world. Cascade effects, complex interactions between information pro-
cesses, and associated questions over causality are bound to play a role. Perpetrators 
are often never found, and there is a high level of uncertainty about both the risks 
12 https://edpb.europa.eu/
13 Compare with the proposal for a European cyber agency in CEPS 2018. This agency also has the 
authority to attribute attacks.
14 Alongside compensation for actors that have suffered damages, civil liability may also play a role 
in (and serve as an alternative to) public law measures designed to ensure better preparedness. 





and the types of cost that may be involved. As explained in Sect. 4.5, insurability is 
an urgent issue. Insurance is essentially a matter for the market. But where there are 
market failures and risks cannot be hedged adequately, the government can try to 
provide people with more peace of mind.
The government could make insurance compulsory by law – admittedly often a long 
process seen as interventionist. The government could also create a reinsurance fund 
with other actors to ensure that risks are insurable. Such insurance ‘pools’ – where each 
party participates at a predetermined percentage – are often used to insure major or 
technically complex risks. Now that insurers seem to be withdrawing from the market 
for cyber insurance due to fears of excessive claims, a ‘cyber pool’ construction war-
rants further study. As a possible template, the Dutch Reinsurance Company for Terrorist 
Damage insures all sectors for damage up to €1 billion per calendar year, to be provided 
by national insurers, international reinsurers and the Dutch state.16 In 2003, the 
Netherlands led the way internationally with this construction.
As part of this exploration, identifying and quantifying ‘systemic risks’ deserves 
special attention. Insurers, large utility companies, banks, multinationals, and gov-
ernments around the world are increasingly turning to quantitative models to man-
age cyber risks. Although this is a step in the right direction, there are as yet no 
reliable methods for identifying systemic risks – a fluid and complex category of 
risk that goes beyond the level of individual organizations. The government could 
contribute to the development of more reliable methods through steps such as mak-
ing its knowledge and data available to other parties.
It is also important to determine whether cyber-attacks can be regarded as armed 
conflict under international law and, if so, to what extent and which types of cyber- 
attack. As we discussed in Sect. 4.5, this is crucial for the insurability of damage 
caused by cyber-attacks. In order not to unnecessarily obstruct the development of 
a mature cyber-insurance market, national governments should take a cautious 
approach to characterizing cyber-attacks as acts of war.
5.7.2  Make Better Use of Data on Incidents
Recovery and particularly reconstruction provide opportunities to be better pre-
pared for the next incident and to re-evaluate which interests should be given prior-
ity. Learning from past decisions and mistakes plays an important role; learning 
16 Bruggeman & Faure, 2018: 70–72, 82.
Explore the feasibility of a national or European ‘cyber pool’ arrangement in 
order to provide insurance cover for the financial damage caused by digital 
disruption.
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from minor incidents can prevent much larger and more disruptive events in 
the future.
While improving our capacity for collective learning can take numerous forms, 
internal and external supervision would be useful.17 External supervisors, who now 
receive and process incident reports including reports on problems with the continu-
ity of core processes, have valuable data at their disposal. A necessary step towards 
improving our capacity for learning is to gather and make more systematic use of 
the information available to supervisory bodies. Supervisors are important nodes of 
information, well positioned to learn general lessons from series of minor incidents 
and to make this information available more widely. While the legally required 
reports on data breaches, disruptions and continuity problems are currently received 
by various supervisory authorities, the information in these reports is rarely anal-
ysed systematically. As a result, supervisory authorities are depriving themselves, 
and the parties they supervise, of valuable information that could be used to improve 
our level of preparedness for digital disruption. Such information could include 
insights into likely types of perpetrators for specific kinds of attacks.
We need to make better use of the data generated through the NIS Directive’s 
reporting obligations. The Directive specifically aims to ensure greater coherence in 
the cyber security policy of European member states; for this to succeed, govern-
ments must make greater efforts to ensure that data on incidents is better shared and 
analysed at the European level. This task could be assigned to the NIS coopera-
tion group.
5.8  Closing Words
Often without our noticing it, digital infrastructure has become intertwined with 
processes essential to the continuity of our society, economy, democracy and the 
rule of law. In the coming years, this relationship will become ever closer due to 
developments such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and the Internet of 
Things. It is laudable that the protection of digital infrastructure is receiving more 
attention. At the same time, 100% security can never be guaranteed. In addition to 
existing policy, this report has therefore presented the case for better preparedness 
17 WRR, 2013: 150, 155.
Ensure that information on incidents is available at the national and European 
levels; make better use of this information; and provide effective feedback to 
the parties involved in order to strengthen the capacity for collective learning.
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for situations in which digital infrastructure is disrupted or out of action, and there 
is a risk of societal disruption as a result.
There is too much at stake to leave preparing for digital disruption to chance. The 
extent of our reliance on digital infrastructure means that measures must be taken to 
limit potential damage and to ensure that affected parties can recover as quickly as 
possible. Within existing frameworks, the government is hampered in its ability to 
adequately deal with digital disruption; its traditional set of instruments to address 
societal disruption are insufficient for this purpose. The recommendations in this 
section provide a range of options for new ways of doing things. Their implementa-
tion will require a thorough consideration of the role and responsibilities of govern-
ment in a digitizing world.
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